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INTRODUCTION
'Ihe dawning of a new t::poch in Geman history came with the
assumption of power by Adolf Hitler in 19JJ.

Both Otto I as the

Holy Roman EEperor in 963 and likewise Otto von Bismarck through the
unification of Gennany in 1871 had striven to bring about complete
hamony.

But these two Reichs fell into ruin as the dissident elf'lllents

of each of the thirty-nine "Germanies" fought for sovere1 gn ty.

Hitler,

however, won the nearly unanimous support of his own people and so
rose to heights of unparallelled power,

But as Lord Acton wrote to

Bishop Creighton, ''Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

1

Before World War I the European world had been traumatized by

nationalism and racism,

Aftf:"r the war the Diktat of the Treaty of

Versailles (1919) engulfed Germany into a cruel and humiliating peace.

The clause imposed upon the Gennan people which claimed that they alone
were responsible "for causing all the loss and da.111ages to which the
Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals" had been s:...l·-

jected both shocked and frustrated the defeated Genr.ans, 2.nd t<t rr.ak.E:

matters even worse, the Fburteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson
which had promised a fair peace to be guaranteed by a League of

1 "Letter to Bishop Creighton in Acton, Historical Essays and
Studies, n. 6, quoted in Jacques Barzun a.'ld Henry F. Graff, The Modern
R~_:r;cher, Rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World., 19?0) pp.
141-42.
1

2

Nations fail ed. to restore hannony to their
Nor did the Weimar Constitution of

~hat terea.

world,

2

1919, esta.blishing a govern-

ment that reluctantly signed that treaty, solve the problem of smaJ1

In March of 1920,

splinter parties from multi plying increasingly,

As Dr,

a putsch drove the government from Berlin for several days.

G, M, Gilbert, the prison psychiatrist at Nurnberg during the period
of the Trials, 3 stated, "A reversion to authoritarian rule after a
/,

too drastic attempt to impose democracy on an authoritarian culture"._
was bound to occur,

Secret terrorist groups of the Right bE-.§3-n a

campaign of assassination which included t'x: August, 1921, murder of
Matthias Erzberger, the Catholic Center politician who had sigr1ed the
anni~tic2

to end the hostility and bloodshed in Europe,

During this time the "National Socialist Party of the German
workflrs "5 led by Adolf Hitler the son of an obscure, iJ..ler.itimate
Austrian customs official, emerged in Bavaria,

3orn in 1229,

Schicklgruber (Adolf Hitler) quarreled with his fathc:r much of the
time.

He always see.med a bitter and frustrated person.

early teens his hatred for Jews sprang forth,
Mayor Leuger whom Hitler admired as his

6

During his

PromptFd by 'tr.e

favorit~

tutor,

VhmrH::~,

Hitlc~

2 Crane Brinton, J, B. Christopher, and. IL, L. Wolff, ! P.:sto..:::::.
• 1 i za1.1on,
J •
Jd ed , , vo l • 2 ( L!J.!1
D..gl ewooo.' ...r1_i_
• J:•;;
" ,
. ...
.. 1ci
•
Ci vi.
~ :. • ,,
'• . : -:· ·:-:-sr
Hn.11, 1967), pp. 357-580.
Q___f

JThe German name for the city where the llazi pc:rty r2lliu.-;
were held is Niirnberg. Anglicized, Nurnberg becomes Ihrr,.:-.bc:-:·. '.·:.~
Nuremberg Trials were held from 14 November 1945 until 1 Lc:ctm::· t9<~ .•
4 Gustave I·ark Gilbert, The

::tonald Press Co, , 1:>50), p. 5.

Psvcho1,or:y~12

(Nc1-r Yu:; :

;:

·The Party i.s callnd "Nazi'' as an

abbr,.vi:~· ,;c; ..

C'i'

'..~

,;

w·:-~':1

;·l·

; ·''

J
"associated socialism with the .Jews and lumped both together as somehow responsible for his own personal troubles and for the ills of the
world. ,,7

The w:rltinc;s of the French Count Joseph Arthur Gobineau

(1816-1882) 1 responsiblE· for laying down the "pseudo-scientific
foundation for modern theories of 'Nordic' and 'Aryar,' supremacy, 118
also greatly infl.uenced Hitler.

He began to see in the world around

him that the Semitic elements coupled with the Teutonic race were
responsible for destroying the Germanic civilization.

In his mind he

wanted his "fellow Germans" to fight for more living space, Lebensraurr..
This also meant for Hitler the elimination of the money lenders and
bankers who were predominately Jewish.
Hitler's bizarre personality combined with his antagonistic
atti.tudes toward the Jews and his belief that the German people were
supnne prompted his eventual takeover of thf-: goVE.'rr...ment in 1933 as
virtucl dictator.

As early as 1921 he had made hirr.self the Ftlhrer of

the Na ticnal Socialist party or Nazi for short.

During thE nf-;Xt. two

years inflation struck the Weimar Republic due to the political
maneuvPrs of' the government under iTuert who failed to meet the
threat from the Right. 9

incr£~asinc

Hitler, who claimed to be followir.g a middlr

coursf' between the extreme Right, the Communists or: tbe Left, brok( in tu
a ri1.):t-winc political meeting in a .Munich beer-hall in l\ovrnber 7,

1923 <::i.nd proclaimed that the "national revolution" had begur:.

7Brintcn, et.al., Histon:: of Ci~ilization, p. 4,51.
· 8 roid.

SentEenccd

4
to five y1,ars inprisonment for disruptive political acti,1ities, Hitler

only spent five months in jail where he wrote tle_in Kampf'. lo

The end of inflation was near in 1924 due to the extraordinary
financial powers of Hans Luther, a minister of finance, and Hjalmar
Schacht, banker and fiscal expert.

In 1925 after President Ebert died,

Paul von Hindenburg was elected a.s President.

During this same year

Gennany signed the Locarno treaties which took the French armies out
of the Rhineland, substituting a neutral 2".0ne and a frontier guaranteed
by Britain in Italy, and setting up machinery for the arbitration of
disputes between Gennany and her neighbors.

These treaties did not,

however, extend Poland's and Czechoslovakia's frontiers with Germany,

Gennany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926 with a permanent
seat on the League's Council,

In

1929 Gennany accepted the Kellogg-

Briand Pact which outlawed aggressive war.
Depression hit Gemany in 1929-31 mainly as a result of the
American stock market crash on Wall Street in New York City.

Noi1 foreio

credits on which prosperity had so largely rested (owing to the Dawes
and Young Plans) collapsed,

Henry Morgenthau criticized these two plans

10
This book is said to be the chief ideology of Hitler's
theoretical as well as actual plans carried out to the utrn.:)st degree,
It is also said to be the chief indoctrination by which the Naz3 leader; .
ran Gennany, George Creel asserted that the ideas in Mein Kampf were
"first written by Hegel, I•'ichte, Clausewitz, Treitschkc, and Nietzscnc ••• "
(See George Creel, War CriminaJ.s and Punishment [New York: Robert
McBride & Co. , 1944J , p, 8.) In the Trials themselves the Prosecutim"
stated that Nazi aggression was contained. in Mein ¥.ampf and used as
r:;vidence against them. (See Office of United States Chief of Counsd
Fbr Pro~9cution of Axis Criminality, NazLSill.§J?:lr£~£;! ar~;ior.' ~.·
vol, 1 [Washington, D, c.: Government }'rintL'1G Office, 1946.J , pp.

18?-88.

5
because the United States was building up Gennany and at the same Hme,
. her reparat•ions. 11
Ge·rmany was no t pay i ng .c.acK

During this time the

publicist and journalist, Paul Joseph Goebbels, indoctrinated the

elite black-shirted. SS (Schutzstaffel, or defense corps) which believed
solely in racial purity.

The climate was now ripe for action.

Schleicher resigned his position as Chancellor early in 1933.
Franz v on Papen, a rich Catholic nobleman and a member of the conservative Right, persuaded. Hindenburg to accpe t Hitler as Chancellor.
As Chancellor, Hitler began to transform the government into a dietatorship.

Hitler was thP. chief boss and his favorites served him as

political cronies with a particular emphasis on "mob psychology".

12

From the dictatorship of Hitler's Third Reich and the Second •·10::-T'"'

War raciSlJl 3.Ild nationalism were at work within Germany.

Nazi politicai

theory along with the build up of industry under the Fbur Year Plan,
de-Christianization of religion and culture, distrust of Soviet Ru::.sia,
German reannament

(1935-36), the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, the

dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39, and finally the invasion
of Poland. in 1939 in a blitzkrieg brought the major pa.rt of the Western
World under the direction of Hitler and his Third :Reich.

As a result.,

many people through:Jut E'Urope found themselves subject to ths Gcrnar..

11 Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 1)4.

Germany is Our Problem

12William M, McGovern, From Luther to Hitler:

of Fa.sci~j;.-Nazi Polit!_cal P~l0sophy (Boston:

& Co., 1941), p. 672.

( New York:

The History
Houghton, Mfflin

6

need for slave labor.

While much responsibility lies with the Nazi

leaders along with their chief, Hitler, the lack of unity among Britain,

France, and the United States, and the failure of the League of Nations
were contributing forces which allowed this evil development.
The Third Reich established by Adolf Hitler, like the former two,
collapsed totally, resulting in V-E day (8 May 1945) when Germany and
her allies were at last defeated.

The 1000 years of the third Reich,

to which Hitler continuaJ..ly referred in his inflammatory speeches,
lay

p:rostrat~

and the feathers of the golden eagle fell under the heavy

boots of occupation armies.

The United States of America, the French

Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet
SocialiGt Republics wanted not only to disestablish the German Nazi
dictatorship, but they aJ.so sought to imprint forever in the minds o}
the Gcrma;-, people an indelible picture of their leaders' guilt.

Justicc,

Robert H. Jackson declared in his opening speech at the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal&
We have no purpose to incriminate the whole German people,
We know that the Nazi Party was not put into power by a
majority of the Geman vote, but by an alliance of extreme
Nazis, German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of milita.ricts .13
The purpose of this study is to give a surrJ11ation of the Nuremberg

Trials (14 November 1945--1 October 1946) in which twenty-fo:r "r.:ajor
l3Interru:.tional Military Tribunal., Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International ?tdlita
Tribunal Nurember ,
14 r;cvcr:,ber 194j--1 October 194 , vol • .2 Nurembers, 1947 , pr1. 102-10).

( h•!roafter r·~ferred to as IMT.J ; See also L'ugene I:avidson, The Dcatr\
and L:!. fo of Geman : An Account of' the American Occupation (Ne•-t Yo::ck:
Al fri:- ci /i • K.110 pf, l 9 1 , p , 1 OJ •

7

war cr.i.r.linaJ.s" were tried at the Pal.ace of Justice :i.n Nuremberg, Germany; to prove that Sauckel and Speer were guilty of the crimes they
were convicted of under the London Charter; to present the moral. and
legal aspects; and lastly, to present a general. purview of the Nuremberg decision in light of the primary and secondary sources consul t~;,d.
Principally, the thesis of the author is:

From the German documentary

evidence captured by the Allied forces upon taking Berlin, Fritz
Sauckel and Albert Speer were gull ty of the crimes that convicted them
under the London Charter.

CHAPTER I
PRECEDENTS FOR THE TRIAL

Since the beginning of mankind, there has been no adequate
precedent for a trial of "war criminals."

However, wr:t ters have

pointed to various instances throughout history where the victors
have tried some of the vanquished.
in

The Tribunal that was established

1945 referred to the only modern precedent of this kind, namely,

the trial of Henri Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prisonerof-War Camp during the Civil War, by a U.S. military tribunal in
Washington,

The

u.

S, Government indicted him for causing the death

of many prisoners during the American Civil War.

He was convicted of

having violated the laws and customs of war and thereby executed. 1
Wirz had been tried under Article 59 of the "Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field" of 24 Aprn 15'::

~

according to which prisoners-of-war were liable to prosecution for cr:im' s
they had committed before their capture.

2

But this trial was national,

not international,
Robert K. Woetzel has pointed out other cases from the more
distant past:
F'rom the reports of Xenophon it can be gleaned that after the
1Wilboum E, Benton and George Grimm, eds., Nurember~: G::rrnar:
V~ws of the War Trial,!. (Dallass Southern fl'iethodist University Frcss,
1955), p. 128,
?

'-Robert K. Woetzel, The Nurer.iberg Trials in Inbrnationn.1
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1 §bo), p. 26.
8

La~:,

9
destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotamos in 405 B,C.
by the Lacedaemonian admiral Lysander, the victor called together his allies in order to determine the fate of the prisoners.
The Athenians among the prisoners were accused of a number of
actual and planned war crimes, and they were all sentenced to
death, except for Adeimantus who is supposed to have opposed
the plan for commission of brutalities in the event of a
victory)

In 1474 Sir Peter of Hagenbach was tried by a war crimes tribunal.
Hagenbach pleaded "superior's orders," but the trib'W1B.l sentenced
4
him to death anyway.
Just as it would be difficult to draw a parallel
between the trials of antiquity and the HlT,5 so too it would be hard

to regard Hagenbach's case as a true precedent for the IMT. 6 Then
there was a 1 796 Ehglish case which sustained a conviction for the
furnishing of unwholesome food to French prisoners to the discredit
of the King,

The argument was rejected that the act had not been

perpetrated "in breach of any contract with the public or of any moral
or civil duty,"7

Similar decisions have occurred in states of the U.S.

which administer the common law of crimes and have prosecuted offenses
by ind.i viduals against the law of nations without prior statutory
prohibition of such acts, 8
The ostracism of Napoleon Bonaparte represents an interesting

3 Ibid. t p. 17.
4

Ibid., pp. 19-20.

5Ibid. , p. 19.
6 Ibid •• p. 22.
7Ibid.
8

Ibid., p. 2).

10
Q

instance where joint action was taken to punish the loser."

"In the

limited sense that the IMT was set up by the four major Powers for the·
disposition of the German wartime leaders,
be regarded as a precedent."

thr~

case of Napoleon could

10

During World War I a list of 4,900 "war criminals" including
Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hindenburg, Ludendorf~ and Bethmann Hollweg (eventually lowered to about a dozen) was brought forth, but there was no
trial after the war by an international tribunal.

11

Nillions of peopli

in Britain, France, and America held Wilhelm II personally responsi blc
for the war and "Wilhelm II's desire to excuse himself was heightened

9 Ibid.; See also Davidson, Death and Life of Gennany, p. 100;
Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (l;ew York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 9.
10woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 24.
11 Eue;f',ne Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An AccoU!:t of' ~h·
Tw€ntv-two Defendants Before the International Eilita • Tribunal r.;t
rurenberg New York: llacmillan, 19 6 , p. ); Sheldon Glueck irr.(i.in::
thn t the Allied countries favored these Germans for trial. (Se~' ;)D,r ·.1 C:•.:
Glueck, War Criminals: UbeL: Prosecution and Punish.rnent] Hew York:
Alfred Ao Knopf, 1944 , pp. 24, 37); "But Williara II was to 0(· chu.:rc;i·~
on r1oral and political grounds in a legal procef'ding, while ai. liurcr1·uef.
trH'c df- fendants were accused of having committed crinE'S agaim:.t intc1na tional law a.nd the law and customs of warfare, In that sonsr;, the
proposf;d tribunal could not be regarded as a prececi.cnt for the J:I:'.: •
On the other hand, the 'mixed commissions' before which persons who
had committed illegal acts against several nations were to be tric<l,
comes closer to bE:ing a precedent for the IET; but they would have·
appJ iPd the procedures and definitions of crimes cor.tained ir: i..hf.
rnili tary penal codes of the nations participating in the n,spf~ct:i. vc
trial, while the Nuremberg court applied the law of th€ Cr~::.rt• l of ~~"
n:T." (See Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 35.) He. conclud<?c ~.h:.t ;.!,. ~·(
is "no exact precedent for the IHT at NurembErg," roid., p. JS, S' ;_ c.l.~w
Geor~e A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law," Ancrlc<.:J
Jou_'Y'!laJ. of International Law 41 (January 1947); 35; HPrmar; Pblrgcr,
"Nurer:-tbcrg--A F'air Trial? Dynamic Law," Atlantic Lo:r.thly 17:7 (f,pril
0

19h6):

6).

11

the campaign which had sprung up in Eng.land to bring him to trial
12
as a 'war criminal.,'"
'lbe Allies decid.ed to try him, but the Dutch

by

said that they would not give up the exilro Kaiser to the Allies because
Holland was not a signatory o:f the Versailles Treaty.

Finally, after

much argumentatial, the Allies yielded to the Dutch refusal. 13
Nevertheless, there was a trial of some German leaders by the
G€nnan govemment in 1921 a.t Leipzig.

Six out of sixteen of the de-

fendants were found guilty, but those who were sentenced to jail were
14
released within a short period of time.
Writing many years later, thr
Secretary of the Treasury under Roosevelt, declared that these trials
had been absura.. 1 5 Consequently, among the methods for a trial, "the

alternative of using German courts had little support.

Men

remembered

Leipzig and wished no recurrence of the legal scandal perpetrated
there. 16 Hence, in the minds of the four signatories of the London
Agreement of 8 August 1945 that established the Tribunal to try "major
12 v1rginia Spencer Cowles, The Kaiser (New York:

Harper &

Row, 1963), p. 407.
l3Ibid., pp. 414-16; See also Ellg;ene Ia.vidson, Th.e Nuremberg
Fallacy: Wars and War Crimes Since World War II (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 13; Idem, Death and Life of Gennany, p. 100;
William J. Bosch, Jud ent on Nurember : American Attitudes 'l'oward
the 1".ajor German War-Crimes Trials Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1970), p. 6.
14
Davidson, Death and Life of Germany, p. 101.
15r.iorgenthau, f!ermany is Our, Problem, PP• )-4.

16Bosch, Ju<!grnent on Nuremberg, p. 9; Glueck, War Criminals,
pp. 31-2; J. H. Morgan asserted that the Leipzig trials of 1921
were "farcical," in J. H. Morgan, The G·reat Assize: An Examination
of th1~ Law of the Nuremberg Trlals-TICndon:- John Viurray, 1948), -:r~· 3:
Woetzel, Nururiber1; I'rials, p. ~16; Quin::::,y ~Jricht, "International Law
and Gull t by Association," American Journal of International Law l~J

(October 1949) i 753 •

---

1?
war criminals" was th8 ubiquitous and perplexing fact that before this
Agreement, there were no true precedfonts specifying "trial of major
war criminals" except the Moscow Declaration a:r:d other conferences
during the war.

17

In 19l-1j many individuals in the U.S. State Departmentan:i ad-

ministration supported a trial • 18

Since the end of the Trials the rr:ajori t:,·

of international lawyers have also favored the Tribu..11al. 19

The American

people themselves resented the atrocites of the German leaders durine
• ..Ye d th a t th
. h ed ir;
. some way. 2 0
th e war and b e1 J.E
· ey s h o uld b e punis

In 1945 Henry Morgenthau issued his "plan 11 for turninc Gcr:::ai::y

into an agricultural country, "depriving Germa.'1y of all hFavy industries."

21

He gave figures and statistics to support his "plan 11 ,
.,~.

which he claimed would produce a final peace..

1...t:

He stated that a dic-

armed Germany would be r,a.fer to world security. 2 3
Morgenthau proposed that the Nazi leaders be E:xccuh.d as the
end

1
so~u

ti on t o hi s " p l .an " f'or res·oring
t
.
ha rmony. 24

1?Consult i\ppendix C for the London Agreemer;"':.
18
'Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, p.

39.

19 Ibid., p. 40,
20

Bosch,
of Germany, pp.

Ju~nt

55-6.

on NurembPr5, p.

Thac:..-: h

ari(i l~

1 f<"

-~-,~-·~-"~ _..._'<'·-~---

21 Horgenthau, Germany is Our Problem, p. 1(; See ah:o Boser,
Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 82.
22Morgenthau, Germany is Our l?robh:r:-i, pp. xi:.-xiii, :_s-tl, 1-1-P-t
23Ibid., p. 187.
24Ibid., p. Js E\1gene Clitton GurrJ.Z,rt, !~~ricr:.'::_; J1ci'::Jcat•:
RobP.rt H. Jackson (bdianapolisi bobbs-:.cr::::.L. '..!o., .:D.c., ::;;:;8),

1 •

~·-

13
Stimson, Secretary of War, arguF:d that the leaders of Nazi Germany
should bt' given a fair trial.

The majority of American poeple as

well as the other victorious powers supported Stimson's views.

Like-

wise the governments of these countries backed public feelings.

With-

out much ado Stimson won his cause for a trial. 25 Throughout the war
itself, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill together had warn0d

the Germans that they would be held accountable for "war crimes. 1126

On 1 Novembf;r 19ll-J, the U.s. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Molotov,
and Eden signed the .t-ioscow Declaration, promising a "trial of war
criminals" but naming no one. 27

At Potsdam on 17 August 1945, Stalin
~r>

appeared with a list of those to be tried as "major war criminals. ,,c.·_·,
Nd tbr:r the· Arnr:ricans nor the British objected to the well-known Nazi
leari•'T~;•

~·
trial--including such menas Goring,
Hess, Ribb12ntrop,

Keitel, ;£r,i tz, Kal ten brunner, Frick, Streicher, Krupp, Schacht, '"- ~
von PapEn,

This list was adopted by the Allied on 1 August 1945.

2 5Bosch, Jud

ent on 1·.urember , p. 8; Jay W. Baird, ~d.,
From };~rcmberg,~Lai Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. HPath
& Co.' 1972), pp. 14-25.

26 Davidson, Trials of the Germans, p. 6.
27 Ibid •• n. 5; Woetzel. Nuremberg Trials, pp. i.J.-5; fi"'.JJ·[,er
"Nur'":m berg- -A :Fair Trial?" p. 61 ; Eur ray C. Bernays, "Legal Bad~·
of the l~uremberg Trials," SurvE~y Graphic 35 (January 1946): 13;
Jesse Joseph Silvergate, "The Role of the Conspiracy Doctrh;E ir,
the liun·mberg War Crimes Trials," Ph. D. dissertation, Ur..ivt::rni't,y
of Wisconsin, 1969 (Ann Arbor, ~lichigan: University Viicrofi1ms,
1970), pp. 20-1; Viscount Viaugha.'11, U.N.O. and War Grines, fos'Lscr.:.;:,:,
by Lord Hank.Py (London: John !-iurray, 1951), p. 25.
') P.

' ''Brin ton, et al. , History of Civil~ zation, p. _541;
Silvergatrc, "Conspiracy Ibctrine," pp. 22,25.

14
:>n

With the roundup of the Nazi leaders· " after Berlin was

smri.~;h0d

by the Allies in early 1945, the "major war criminals" were brought
before the International Military Tribunal in the Gernan city of

Nurnber~O

which had stood since 1933 as the syn:bol of the victories

of the Third Reich.

'Ihe Allies had destroyed much of this city by

bombings on 21 April 1945.

It was not chosen as the place for the

trial because Hitler had failed to make it the principal city of
the Nazis, but because Nuremberg offered the best accommodations
of any city in Germany.

ThP. large Palace of Justice on thr, wio;stem

edge of the city had escaped with little damage during the wa.r.3 1
The Russians, who WE.re against the trial being held anywhere elsE· but
in Berlin, reluctantly agreed.
Not only did the chief Nazi leaders have to be apprehi:;nded and
brought to justice, but also the truckloads of German govc r:::::, nt
2 9'Ihe four signatories were responsible for capturir.g thr
"najor war criminals." The U.S. took custody of Fritz Sauckr:l ori
10 Eay 19i.15 with his place of internment at BrJrchtesgad(~n. Th<,
British placf'd Albert Speer in Gleveksburg on 23 Lay 1945. (See
Officro of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, Hazi Conspiracy and Aggressiop, 8 vo:J..s, (Washington, D. C. :
Govcr~ment Printing Office, 1946-48], 2:1083.)
\licreaftc:r n.forrcc
to as NCi1,] See also William Hamsher, Albert ~ccr--Victi~ of l~u:t''._ct·u~'
(London: Leslie Fn~win, 1970), p. 6; SpEcer was takir,g a b<.. :.!~ at t.L·
time of his canturc in Ibid. , p. 219; Al bt~rt Speer, Insid(. th0 Tn ·:rd
Reich: Iierr.oir~, trans, by R:i.chard and Clara Winston\:1kw :ork:
---Eacmillan Co. , 1970), p. 500, Davidson d<,scri bed the roi.mG.~-.:· b1
some detail in Davidson, Trial of the Gerr::ans, p. 20.
0

30'Ihis city was the sight of the famous Gen.an pain ':,(;r,
Albrecht Druer an:1 the Protestant center during the ?.eforma:.ior:.
Lying on the Pegnitizy River, ninety-two r:iiles northwest o:· :.unicb,
Nuremberg is the second largest city in Bavaria. (;:>E:;e Cecil Heaclla:,
The Story of Nuremberg (London: J. I·:. Ient & Co., 1399
v:M.cb
is an old but yet an accurate accou..11t of the history of Nu:.::-0:-:°t)erg.

J . :,

3 1 Peter Calvocoressi, Nuremb0rc;: '::'le· F;c1cts, th,, :i.. c-.w, and ttv'
Conseguences (London: Chatto ana Windus, 19h7), p. (;; D.:...vic..:.;'.Jn, 'irial
of tb_~ Germans, p. 19.
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documents had to be translated and studied; the roundup of witnesses
from the wreckage of the fallen Gennan Reich, from the

fori~c:::-

con-

ccntra.tion camps, from the prisoner-of-war st.ockages of neutral and
Allied countries had to take place so that the evidence could be
brought before the eyes of everyone.

Eugene Davidson stated:

To punish those guilty of the murder of mil.lions of combatants, to evidence the continuing collaboration of the
victorious Allies, to establish once and for all in a
court of law the personal responsibility of political and
nili tary leade:r;:; for the crime::; of aggn;ssive warfare and
of a totalitarian Fascist st.ate against its own pr:ople "-nd
those of foreign countries--that is what Anc rican officials
in Washington and London and Nuremberg told their allies,
as well as the Ge mans and neutrals, the Allies had been
fighting for,32
The difficulty arose as to how the massive amount of nater:i.a1,
due to the meticulous efforts of the German govern.r,ie:nt, was to be
handled.

It had. to be read by a staff of intcrpreti:::rs only after

it was complied and integrated.

In the Nuremberg story of 1945-l;.6,
').

':·

then; arc more than fifty volumes of documentary mati::rial ,··0

32 Davidson, Trial of_ih.£ Germans, p. 2.
33see TI>IT, 42 vols.; NCJ\, 8 vols,; and. also two suppl0:·:cntary
volwM:'!s, Office: of United States Chief of :o1.Z1f~c1 io!· Trosc:::Jt:i.oL
of Axis ~:riminaJ.ity, Nazi 9on:'2J.?iTil;S:L~nd .!.:J'/7E"~:-.;ior. ,_ Cphiic·:. <..i.!!U
1
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CHAPTER II
'IRE LONOON CHARTER OF 8 AUGUST 1945

Up to now thel.-e appeared to be so sufficient precedents in
intemational. 12w specifying a "trial of war criminals."
penheim stated that the law of nations is binding. 1
tory men have wr1 tten on just and unjust wars.
doctrine of

L. Op-

Throughout his-

The Romans held a

~ta belli. 2 Toward the beginning of the Middle Ages,

writers such as St. Augustine voiced their opimons.

St. Augustine

asserted that three justa causa of war existed:

recovery of pro-

(1)

perty, (2) vengeance, and (J) punishment of one's enemies. 3
Acquinas opposed the lies and violations of war.

St. Thomas

4

Later writers such as Francisco Vitoria (1480-1,546), Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645), Christian von Wolff (1679-17.54 ), Emmerich de Vattel
c

(1714-67), and others contributed. to the body of international law/
Of these renowned men, Hugo de Groot or Grotius of Holland became known
11. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed., edited by
H. Lautcrpacht, vol. 1 1 Peace (New York: I.avid McKay, Co. , 1967), pp.
4-5. See also Carl Philip Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations; An Introduction
(New Yorks fl'.a.cmillan Co., 1948) and J. L. Brierly, The Law of Natior[':
An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed. , cdi ted by
Sir Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
2

Benton and Grimm, eds., German Views of the Trials, p, 5; Woetzel,
Nuremberg Trials, p. 124; Baird, From Nurembezw, to My Lai, p. 116.
)Benton and Grimm, eds., Gennan Views of the Trials, p, 8;
Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 12 •
4 Benton and Grimm, eds., German Vi,ews of the Trials, p, 8;
Woetzel, Nuremb~rg Trials, pp. 126-27.

%enton and Grimm, eds., Gennan Views of the Trials, p, 9,

16

17

as the "Father of Intemational Law".

His celebrated and monumental

work is De jure belli ac pacis {1625-27).

He dealt with the causes of

war, reducing the causes of lawfUl wars to defense of person or pro-

perty and the punishment of offenders.

6 Vattel claimed that self-de-

fense, redress of injury, and punishment of offenses are justa causa
for war. 7
Besides the writing of men on international law, J. L. Brierly
listed other sources of international law such as customs, treaties,
judicial precedents, general principles, and rea.son. 8 Oppenheim has
a good deal of infonnation on the subject of what constitutes international law, also. 9 In an appendix to his work, Creel gave the "Rule::;
of Land Warfare" of the Hague Convention of 1907 •10 Article 56 of the
"Rules" stated that
All seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done
to such institutions, historical monuments, works of art and
science, is forbid.den, and should be made the subject of legal
proceed.ings.11
However, the "Rules" did not specify the exact legal proceedings nor
the degree of punishment.

Furthermore, they did not include punishment

6Brierly, The Law of Nations, p. 32; Oppenheim, International
Law, vol. 1, pp. 6, 84-5, 91; Bosch, Jud.gment on Nuremberg, p. 60;
Woetz~l, Nuremberg Trials, pp. 128-29; Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimes,
p. 86,
?Brierly, '!he Law of Nations, p, 39,
8

Ibid., pp. 57-66.

9see Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1.

10 Creel, War Criminals, pp. 288-91.
11Ib.,
1.Q •• p. 91.

for violations against humanity or peace which the Tribunal was later
to place in the Indictment counts.
Treaties such as the Geneva Convention stipulations,

12 the Geneva

Protocol of 1924, 1) and the previous Article 228 of the Versailles
Treaty, the Tribunal recognized that Germany had acknowledged the
right of Allied powers to try and punish "war criminals. 1114 However,
the most often referred to treaty by writers is the Kellogg-Briand
Pact or the Treaty for the Rerumciation of War of 1928, which Germany
signed a year later.

12

15

'lhis treaty bound over sixty states from startin(;

Oppenheim, Intemational Law, Vol.

1, p. 60.

13Bemays, "Legal. Basis of the Nuremberg Trial.s," p. 9; Robert
H, Jacksont 'lhe Niirnberg Case (New York: Cooper Square Publishers,
Inc., 1971), P. 15.

14John Alan Appleman, Mili ta
Tribunals and Intemational Crimes
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19.54 , pp. 51-2; 1!fI, Vol. 1, .n~"·
222-23; See also Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 5; Phleger, "Nurer.ibE:rg-A Fair Trial.?" p. 63 •
15Silvergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine," p. 39; Jackson Nurnberg Casi:: r
p. 15, cited by Jackson as evidence for aggression; see also Gerhart,
America's Adocate, p. 344; Baird, From Nuremberg to MY Lai, p. 117;
"During the preparation of my previous book on the _subject of war crimes,
[War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment_; I was not at all
certain that the acts of launching and conducting an aggressive war
could be regarded as 'intemational. crimes.' I finally decided against
such a view, largely on the basis of a strict interpretation of the
Treaty for the Renunciation of War (BrianC:.-Kellogg Pact), signed iri
Paris in 1928" in Sheldon Glueck, The Nurember Trial and
£<ressive
!!.£ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946 , pp, 4-5; Mr. Kellogg made the:;e
remarks before the House Committee for Foreign Relations of the U .s.
Senate in December, 1928: "But howthe:m can be a moral obligation for
the Uni t(,>d States to go to Europe to punish the aggressor or punish
the party making war •••• " Quoted by Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimez,
p, 68; Lavidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy, pp. 14-15; Appleman held the
View that aggressive war is a crime, and referred to the Kellogg-Briant
Pact in Appleman, Military Tribunals, pp. 26-7; Woetzel is sornewh~t
ambiquously pro-Nuremberg in championing the p:,i.ct in hoetz<::J.., Nurembere;
Trial§, pp. 143-49; Yet, Woetzel took a firm stc.nd ir; the end against
it: "It is correct, therefore, that at

an aggressive war.

Could the Germa.ns use sdf-defense as a:1 a.rgi.r::cnt?

They thought they could.

16 Additionally, Oppenheim 1 ike

1-llrray

Bernays

pointed out that the fundamental answer for not basing outbreaks of
aggression on the Pact was that the Pact fell apart because it provided no sanctions in case of violations. 17

It the Pact had clearly

defined "aggression" and laid out the punishments for it, then there
would be no question as to its worth in international law.
Oppenheim concluded in the following manneri
'!he shortcomings of the Pact, from the point of view of its
professed object, have already been noted in this chapter.
'!hey are: the uncertainty as to how far the prohibition of
resort to war includes measures of force short of war;
the absence of any provision for authoritative ascertainment
of breaches of the Pact; the failure to provide for collective enforcement of its obligations, at least to
the extent of a mitigation of the rigidity of the established rules of neutrol.i ty to the disadvantage of the
the outbreak of the Second World War, the question whether indivlduaJ
liability attached to a violation of the provisions of the Kellogg Pact
remained fundamentally unanswered. The terms 'aggression' and 'S.nternations crime' were also left undefined. The Pact was a document
latent with meaning; but without interpretation by an authoritative
source," in Ibid., p. 1.53; Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial:
Landmark in Law," Foreign Affairs 2.5 (January 1947): 182-83,
without a doubt is pro-Nuremberg; Bernays, "Legal Ba.sis of the
Nuremberg Trials," p. 9, stating that aggression was "illegal but
not criminal" which indeed is the heart of the matter; Finch, "The
Nuremberg '!'rial and International Law," pp. 26, J3, (Pro-Nuremberg);
Brierly, The Law of Nations, pp • .54, 408-11; Benton and Grimm, eds.,
German Views of the Trials, p. 11; Oppenheim discussed the Pact in
depth in Oppenheim, International Law: A 'l'reatise, ?th ed, , ed.i ted by
H. Lauterpacht, Vol. 2: Disputes, War, and Neutrality {New York:
David Mckay, Co., 196.5), pp. 177-97; The Treaty bound over sixty
states from starting an aggressive war, in Oppenheim, International
~' Vol, 2, p. 188.

16 Ibid,
1? Ibid. , pp. 190-91 ; Bernays, "Legal Basis of the Ifore.11berg
Trials," p, 9; Benton and Grlnun, eds., German Views of the Trials, p. 15.

?O

law-breaker; and the absence of a duty expressly laid
do~m in the Pact to submit disputes between its signatories
to impair the political significa..•1cE; cnd thP "Prospects of
observance of the Pact. But in law the terms of the
Pact are very comprehensive, and the danger of the purpose of the' Pact being frustrated lies not in the nonnal
operation of its provisions, but in the possibility of
their violation by the signatories.18
Thus, one can distinctly see that a big problem thwarted the
move for action against the German leaders.

According to Platonic

logic, according to Henry Stimson, the Allies could have:

(1)

turned

the Gennan leaders lose., (2) given them back to Genna.ny, or (3) tried
them in an international court according to the best standards of the
law • 1 9

The Allies chose the latter method of operation, dismissing

the fourth possibility of trial also by neutrals.

On 8 August

1945

representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland, the Provisional Government of the French Republic,
and the USSR signed in London a short Agreement of seven articles

which created the International Military Tribunal, giving it tems
of reference.

This London .Agreement referred back to an earlier

meeting, the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 in which Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin

had announced

to the world that German officers

and men and members of the Nazi Party, who had been responsible for
or had consented. to atrocites and crimes in occupied countries, would
be sent back to the scenes of their crimes for punishment by the govern-

ments of those countries in accordance with their laws, and that (following the provisions of Article 229 of the Treaty of Versailles)

18Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 2, p. 196.
19Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial," p. 179; see also Baird,
From N~~".mberg to My !:.ai, pp. 114-15.
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"major war cri.'ninals whose offenses had no particular geographical
location" would be ptmished by the joint decision of the Allies.
The London Agreement established seven articles in light of
the United Nations declarations and the Moscow Declaration of 1 November

1943 that "war criminals shall

be brought to justice. 1120

The first

article created an "International Milita.r,y Tribtmal for the trial of
war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical location." 21
Not only were the chief Ge:rman leaders to be held responsible, but
the members in the Nazi government organization were to be held equally
accountable.

The second article set up the constitution, jurisdiction,

and fUnctions of the Tribunal established in the Charter.

Thirdly,

each signatory had to take the necessary steps required for the investigation and the trial of "major war criminals."

Cl.early stated in

the fourth article was the agreement that nothing should prejudice
the provisions established in the Moscow Declaration concerning the
return of war criminaJ.s to the countries where they committed. their
crimes.

The fifth article states that "any Government of the United

Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through the

di~lo-

matic channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall infonr.
the other signatory and adhering Government of each such adherence."
FUrthe:rmore, there were to be no prejudices to enter this trial as
Article Six stated.

Article Seven executed. this .Agreement into law

the 8 August 1945. 22
20

IM'£, Vol • 1 , p. 8.

21 See Appendix c.
22
IMT 1 Vol. 1, PP• 8-9.

The Charter23 of the International Military Tribtma.l included
the Constitution, jurisdiction, and general principles.

Thus, th€ rul c!:,.

were laid down providing that the competence of the Tribunal could be
challenged neither by the prosecution nor by the defense, that its
decisions would be made by a majority vote1 the deciding vote in the
event of a tie was to be cast by the President of the Court, Lord
24
Justice Geoffrey Lawrence of Great Britain,
There were three crimes
that became the basis for the four counts; namely, a common plan or
conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
charged against the "chief Nazi leaders" in their indictments, 25
There were five other parts in the Charter that established

a "Committee for the Investigation and Prosecution of Major War Criminals,"
also including a fair trial for defendants, the powers of the Tribunal,
and the conduct of the Tri.al, judgment and sentence, and expenses. 26
The United States was the creator of the conspiracy count az
well as its leading promoter of the triale 27 Before the clause on
aggressive warfare had been adopted, some argumentation developed over
28
the phrasing,
Robert Houghwout Jackson, who had been a lawyer, a
2'.3eonsult Appendix D,

24IMT, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9.
25IMT, Vol. 1, p. 11; New York Times, 9 October 1945, sec, 2, ~·
26 IMT, Vol, 1, pp, 1J-16.
27Sil vergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine," p. 2; Conspiracy was related
to all four counts in the indictment, and therefore, the heart of the
case. (See NCA, Vol, 1, p. '.370; Il1T, Vol. 2, p. 241.) Conspiracy and
aggression are described in detail by the Il1T in NC.-1, Vol. 1, pp. 114-;::
28 Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 10.

2J
Solicitor General, and Attorney General, and at the time that Truman
appointed him to the Tribunal,

au. s.

Supreme Court Justice, 29 stated:

What we are trying to do is to depart from ours and find a
system which, while it follows the general. philosophy of
our system is one on which we can hope to try these cases
0
in a reasonable length of time and without undue difficulty .3
Jackson believed that the Briand-Kellogg Pact supported his views on
a.ggression.3 1 The Americans had approximately 200,000 war prisoners,
but they wanted to avoid a separate trial for each.

Thus, they insisted

upon the conspiracy plan.3 2
Therefore, the United States handled col.mt one; the British,
count two; the French, col.mt three; and the Russians, count four.33
'!he Chief Prosecutors of the four Allied countries weres

Justice

Robert H. Jackson of the U.S.; H. M. Attorney-General, Sir Hartley
Shawcross of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
General R. A. Rudenko of the USSR; and M. Francois de Menthon and M.
Auguste Champetier de Ribes of the French Republic. 34
of his respective country had a retinue of associates.
composed a team of four plus their aJ. ternatives:

Each prosecutor
The judges

Sir Geoffrey Lawrence

of Britain (President of the Tribunal) and his alternative, Sir Williari

29
.
Gerhart, America's Advocate, p. JOB.
JOQuoting Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 12 in Gerhart,
America's Advocate, p. )26.

31Gerhart, America's Advocate, p. 344.
32 Ibid,, p. )JO; See also Silvergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine,"
pP. 25, 72, 105; Robert H. Jackson, 'Ihe Case Against the Nazi War
Criminals, Preface by Gordon Dean (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946),
. p. Vii; IMT, Vol. 1, p. 30.
33Gerha.rt, America's AE.yQcate, p. )62.
34rMT, Vol. 1, pp. 3-5.

Birkett; Mr. Francis Biddle of the U.S. and Judge john J. Parker; 1'1.
Le Professeur IOnnedieu de Vabres of France and M. Le Conseiller R.
Falco; and Major General I, T, Niki tcheneko of the USSR with Lieutenant

Colonel A. F. Volchkov,35

35 IMT, Vol. 1, p. 1. ( Note that the Russians wore their
mili tarJ insignia at the Trials,)

CHAPTER III
INDICTMENTS AND SENTENCES OF TWENTY-FOUR NAZI LEADERS
AND SIX NAZI ORGANIZATIONS
'Ihe F\J.nrer, Adolf Hitler, had committed suicide in his Bunker
in Berlin ten hours before the Allies reached him.

Joseph Paul Gob-

bels, the Propaganda Minister, had also committed suicide along with
his family, taking potassium cyanide capsules.

Likewise 1 Henrich

Himmler, the leader of the SS, took his own life by cracking a
potassium cyanide crystal during an examination by a British doctor.

1

'Ihere remained twenty-four other chief Nazi government officials alive
and six Nazi organizations indicted on various crimes.
Among the other twenty-two defendants besides Sauckel a.nd

Speer, there were:

Hermann Wilhelm Goring, the Number-Two Man in the

Nazi govemment, Trustee of the Fbur-Year Plan, Reich Minister for
Air, and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Fbrce; Rudolf Hess, deputy

to the Fiihrer, successor designate next to Hitler, a.nd a member of the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich; Joachim von

Rib~ntrop,

Ambassador to Great Britain, and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Robert
Ley, Leader of the Labour Front (who hanged himself before the Trials
started on 25 October 1945); 2 Wilhelm Keitel, Head of the OKW (High
1
Hamsher, Albert Speer, p.
2

177.

Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 6; Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials,

:p. 2.

25

Command of the Anned Fbrces), member of the Ministerial Council for
the Defense of the Reich, and a Rl.eld-Marshall; Ernst Kaltenbrunner,
Chief of the SS in Austria., State Secretary for Security in Austria,
Chief of the (Gennan) Security Police, and Security Service (SD), and
Head of the RSHA in the Ministry of the Interior and SS; Alfred Rosenberg, Head of the Foreign Department of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter
for Ideology, Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Fili.tor
of the Volkischer Boobachter, and Head of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg;
Hans Frank, Minister without Portfolio, Reichslei ter for Legal Affairs,
and Governor of Pola.nds Wilhelm Frick, Minister of t.he Interior, Plenipotentiary for Home .Administration, Member of the Ministerial Council
for the Defense of the Reich, a.nd Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.;
Julius Streicher, Ga.uleiter of ,Franconia and Eliitor of Der Stunner;
Walter F\J.nk, Government Press Chief, State Secretary in the Propaganda
Ministry, Minister for Economics, Plenipotentiary for War E.conomy,
President of the Reichsbank, Member of the Ministerial Council for thr:::
Defense of the Reich; Hjalmar Schacht, Minister for Economics, Plenifor War Economy, President of the Reichsba.nd, Minister without Portfolio;
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Chainna.n of Krupp A.G.; Karl rbni tz,
Commander-in-Chief of U-boats, Commander-in-Chief of the Gcrr.ian liav;;,
Grossadmiral, Head of the Ge:rma.n State after Hitler's death; Erich
Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Gennan Navy and Grossad.T11iral; Badur
von Schirach, Youth Leader, and Governor a.nd Gauleiter of Vienna; Alfred
Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Generaloberst; Martin
Bonna.nn, Deputy to the Ftihrer, and Head of the Cha.ncellory of the Nazi
Party; Jiranz von Papen, Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, Ambassador to

27
Austria, and Ambassador to Turkey; Artur Seyss-Inquart, Minister of
the Interior and Chancellor of Austria, Commissioner for the Netherlands, Minister without Portfolio; Constantin von Neurath, Minister
without Portfolo; Hans Fritzsche, Chief of Radio Propa.ga.nd.a, &litor
of DNB, and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of Radio
in Greater Ge111ta.ny.3

'lhe Tribllllal indicted GOring on all four counts; na'lllely, a
common plan or conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity; convicted on all of them, and sentenced to death by
hanging.

Hess was indicted on al.l four counts, convicted on the first

two, and sentenced to life imprisonment in Spa.ndau prison, remaining
there to this day even though the Allies, excluding Russia, have
pressed for his release a number of' times. He is a man over eighty
years of age.

Ribbentrop was also indicted on all four counts and

convicted of them; hence, death by hanging.

Keitel was indicted

and convicted on all four collllts--death by hanging.

Kaltenbrunner

was convicted on the last two even though he was also charged with
the first one. He was sentenced to be hanged.

Rosenberg received the

same indictment, verdict, and sentence as Keitel, Jod.1 1 and Rosenberg.
Frank received the same indictment, verdict, and sentence as Kaltenbrunner.

F.rich was also sentenced to death after being indicted on all four
collllts and convicted of the last three, but Funk, for the last listed
items, was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Tribllllal regarding Streicher was:

3IMT, Vol. 1, pp, 68-79.

'lhe final decision of the

charged on Counts One and Fbur;

28

convicted on Count Four; verdict--dea.th by hanging.

4

'Ihe Chairman of the Krupp Works, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen,
suffering from senility, was seventy-eight years old at the time of the
Because he was unable to appear in court, his son Alfried,

Trial.

whom the court felt was as equally responsible, was tried by a later
American court, found guilty of divers crimes, including forced labor,
and sentences to twelve years imprisonment.5 However, he only served
for seven years, and his confiscated property was restored.
'Ihe Minister for Economics, Schacht, along with Fritzsche
and von Papen were acquitted, not being found guilty on any of the

four charges.

Raeder and Funk along with Hess were sentenced to life

imprisonment, but the former two later died with Hess being the only
survivor.

Neurath and OOnitz received a verdict of fifteen and ten

years imprisonment respectively.
yea.rs imprisonment.
in

Schira.ch was sentenced to twenty

Bormann was sentenced to death after being tried.

absentia, but never to this day has he been found.

died during the la.st days of the war.

Presumably, he

Of the twenty-two listed, in-

eluding Sauckel and Speer and excluding Ley and Krupp, twelve were
sentenced to death by handing, three to twenty years imprisonment, one
to fifteen yea.rs, one to ten yea.rs, and three, a.dquitted. 6 However,
the Russians felt that the three acquitted should have been convicted,

4 Ibid.' pp. 279-341 •.
5Ibid., p. 145.

6

.

Ibid., pp. 364-7; Calvocoressi, !'l!!I'Cmberg, p. 141; Bormann

was offic.ially declared dead in 1954 by a Gem.an court at Eerchtesgaden; he most probably was killed on 1 l'iay 1945. (See Woetzel,
Nuremberg Trials, p. 2.)

29
In their

and they disagreed over the Tribunal's judgment of Hess.

"Dissenting Opinion" after the final verdicts, the Soviet Member
disagreed that the Reichscabinet, General Staff, and the OKW should

be declared ir.noccnt. 7

to declare it a crime

The prosecution staff asked the Tribunal

for an individual to have belonged to the chief Nazi organizations.

(1)

'Ihe major Nazi organizations indicted were:

(2) Leadership Corps of the Party; (J)

Reicbskabinett;

SS and SD (including the

Cr.tminal Police, the Security Police, and the RSHA); (4)

(5)

Gestapo; and (6)

General Staff and High Command.

SA;
The Tribunal

declared the SS and the SD, the Gestapo, and the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party criminal organizations.

However, it acquitted the

Reich Cabinet, the SA, and the General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Fbrces.

8

'Ihe Trials opened on 20 November 1945,

Each of the twenty-two

defendants was arraigned and pleaded not guilty9 as each stepped up to
a microphone set in front of the dock,
August

From that day until the

'.31

1946, the Tribunal sat five to five and a half days each week

except for short recesses over the usual holiday periods.
delivered on '.30 September and 1 October

1946.

Judgment was

In addition to the

documentary infonnation presented as evidence, 116 witnesses gave oral
evidence, thirty-three for the prosecution and eighty-three (including

7IMT, Vol. 1, pp. )42-64.
8 Ibid,, pp. 171-279.
9Ibid. t p. 94.

JO
nineteen of the accused) for the defense.

'l'he Trial was conducted in

four different languages simultaneously without the necessity for
breaks for translation,

Each lawyer or witness spoke in his native

language into a microphone,

What he said was made audible to every

person in the court room, judges, accused, lawyers, press and visitors,
over a wired headphone system which they could plug in any of the four
language circuits,
attached to it.

.ENery seat in the court had a pair of headphones

Among those listening to the speaker were a group

of interpreters, who, as the words ca.me to them in their headphones,
repeated them in other languages into microphones.

A staff of trans-

lators made the words available to everyone in return,
worked remarkably well,

'Ihe IBM system

Brf',a.kdowns were few and the saving of time

was immense, 10

1OCal. vocoressi , Nuremberg, pp • 10-11 •

CHAPTER IV
THE LABOR RECRUITER AND ALLOCATOR-FRITZ SAUCKEL
The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, Fritz Sauckel, was
indicted on all four counts.

His indictment read as follows:

The Defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: A
member of the Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter
of Thuringia, a member of the Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor under the Four
Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the
Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a
General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant
SAUCKEL used the foregoing positions and his personal
inf1.uence in such a manner that: He promoted. the accession
to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he participated in the economic preparations for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation
of Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in
Coi.mt.s One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated. in the War Crimes set forth
in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment,
including particularly t~e War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of occupied
countries to wofk as slave laborers in occupied countries
and in Germany.

Sauckel pleaded not guilty to the indictment.

2

The Tribunal

constantly ·.nterrogated him as well as the other defendants before
the sta.rt of the Trials.
Sauckel was sworn in on Tuesday, 28 May 1946, the onE:-hundn<d th1 IMT, Vol. 1, p. 7.3; NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 61-62; New York Time~,
19 October 1945, sec. 10, p.""'i:
?

"]}iT, Vol. 1, p. 94, Vol. 2, p. 98.

31

J?
and-fortieth day of the Trials.

He took the stand ) June 1946,J He

stated that he was the only ch!.ld of the postman, Friederick Sauck!:·l,
born at Hassfurt on the Ilain near Bamberg on 27 October 1894. 4

He

attended the elementary school at Schweinfurt and also the secondary
school.

His mother was a seamstress; his father, a postman,5
Sauckel worked on Norwegian and Swedish sailing ships at the

age of fifteen.

During the first World War, the French captured

Sauckel on a Gennan sailing vessel on the way to Australia.
a prisoner for five years.
years.

He remained

Then, Sa.uckel studied engineering for two

6
In 1923 after having already been in sympathy for sometime with

the party, he joined it.7 Later he became Gauleiter in Thuringia. 8
One of SauckP.l' s first confessions was that "I myself was n"'vAr as SA

man,

was an honorary Oberguppenfilhrer in the Sli ... 9 He was a mer-.b"" r

I

of the Reichstag from 1933 until the end of the war. 10
On 21 I'iarch 1942 through a decree signed by Hitler, Lammers,

J Ibid., Vol, 14, pp. 602 et seq.,--Vol. 15, pp. 1-283.
4 Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 602; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 505.
r.'.

JIHT, Vol 14, p. 60); Lavidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 505.
6rHT, Vol. 14, 60).
7Ibid., p. 604.
8 Ibid. , p. 606; 10.vidson, Trial of the Gerr:aY1s, p. 501~. .-i
Gauld ter was the term the Nazis used :for the poli :.ical lE:c.d~~r of
a district or Fau,

9Il,T,
' Vol. 14, 608.
l OIbid. , p. 609 ,

))
and Keitel, Sauckel was appointed to the position of Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor, 11
not know the reason for being chosen.

Sauckel asserted that he did
He supposed the reason consisted

of his knowledge of engineering and of his former occupation.

12

Robert

Servati us, his defense-counsel, asked whether Speer had suggested his
appointment.

Sauckel replied that "Reichsleiter Bormann stated that

[Speer suggested that Sauckel be appointed Labor Allocator
preamble to his official. decree.

J

in the
1-

I do not know the actual circumstances." j

Nevertheless, the decree of the 21 March 19l.j.2 authorized Sauckel "to
carry out the moblization of Geman and foreign workers, including prisoners of war in the Reich and in all the territories occupied. by
Germany, within the framework of the Fbur Year Plan. 1114
Before the start of the war, the Supreme Command of the German
Anned Fbrces had made plans to use forced labor including not only

prisoners-of-war, but also civilians in the occupied. countries. 1 5
Thousands of Dutch, Polish, and French workers had already gone to the
Reich before Sauckel took office.

Therefore, Sauckel did not initiate

11 Ibid., p. 618; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 5o4; NCA
Vol, 1, p. 909.

12

IMT, Vol. 14, p. 618,

1 3Ibid., pp. 618-19; Davidson pointed out that Speer suggested.
Sauckel's appointment. (See Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 25.)
14 Il1T, Vol 1, p. 4,54, (1666-PS); NCA, Vol. 1, p. 909.
1.5rn'f,

Vol. 5, p. 391; Throughout his book, Ek3.ward L. Homze
indicates that the reason for employing foreign labor was ti".e shortage
of labor at home for production toward the war effort. (See lliward
L. Honze, Forei
Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 19>7.

JL~

such actions.
Sauckel testified that his chief sphere of worl: was in
directing and regulating Geman labor.

He replaced eligible German

draftees and other Gennans with suitably skilled workers.

He admitted

obtaining new labor for the new war industries which had been set up
for food production as well as for the production of armaments.

16 '!hen,

Sauckel described the types of workers:
First there were the workers who were already present in
The Reich from all sorts of caJ.lings who, as I have said,
had not yet be,:m directed to war ecomony, not yet completely incorporated in the way that was necessary for the
conduct of the war. '!hen fUrther there were the prisoners of war as far as their labor was made available
by the anny authorities.17
In answer to another question, Sauckel replied&

Hundreds of thousands of Gennan soldiers had suffered
terribly from the cold; many divisions had lost their
anns and supplies. The Fiihrer explained to me that if
the race with the enemy for new anns, new munitions,
and new dispositions of forces was not won now, the
Soviets would be as far as the Channel by the next
winter. Appealing to my sense of duty and asking me to
put into it all I could, he gave me the task of obtaining
new foreign labor for employment in the German war
economy.18
Sauckel, when asked by Servatius whether he had any scruples that
this was against international. law, replied that the FUhrer had spoken

to him about this question in much detail.

1EIMT,

Vol. 14, p. 620.

17Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 622.

'Ihe Ftihrer convinced him

J.5
to have no misgivings concerning the matter. 19 He also said that he
knew the stipulations regarding the treatment and protection of prisonersof-war according to the Hague land warfare regulations.
felt justified by his conduct and actions.

20

Moreover, he

Furthennore, Sa.uckel

emphasized:
At all times a regime of no matter what nature, can only be
successful in the production of goods if it uses labor
economically--not too much and not too little. That alone
I consider economically justifiable.21

In issuing directives and orders of a departmental nature,
Sauckel could only do so directly to those offices, such as the
"Employment of Labor" and "Wages".

22

Only through the Foreign Office

or by expressed permission from Hitler and the ambassadors or
ministers could Sauckel carry on negotiations with foreign countries. 2J
Sauckel made every effort to enforce his own directives without required
consent from anyone else.

24

Sauckel admitted using "shanghaiing" methods as a means of
19Ibid.; See also Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 205; "Sauckel never for
a moment thought of his assignment as conf1icting with international
law. • • He had been told by Hitler he said virtuously at Nuremberg, that
the use of foreign labor was not contrary to the Hague Convention; but
in an event the Fuehrer had explained, since Russia was not a signatory
to the P.a.gue treaty, its provisions would not apply to Soviet citizens."
(See Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p • .508.)

20

1!:!£,

Vol. 14, p. 62J.

21 Ibid. f p. 625.
22 Ibid., pp. 626-7.
2Jibid., p. 627.

- 24Ibid •• p. 631.

recruiting labor.·25
workf~rs

He stated that "the actual recruitment of foreign

was thf::! ta::k of the German offices established in the various

regions, the offices of military commanders or similar civilian German

institutions. 1126 Sauckel related that several million foreign workers
came to Germany willingly, "as voluntary recruitment was the underlying
principle. 1127

Concerning compulsory methods, Sauckel set forth his

policy:
All these measures [burning down of villages and the shooting
of merl] are clearly in contradiction to the directives and
instructions which I issued and which have been submitted
here in large numbers, and to these I must refer. These are
methods against which, I heardasmuch as hints of them, I
took very sever€ measures.28
At the 1 :March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board,
Sa.uckel stated, however, that
Out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Gennany,
not ev€?l 200,000 ca.me voluntarily.29
Sauckel stated that transportation of workers should be carried
out in an "unobjectionable manner" with plenty of food and no overcrowding in his fourth directive.JO

Sauckel stated that the general

living conditions of foreign workers after they had arrived in Gennany
Z.5Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 4.
26Ib.d
l.

• '

p. 5.

27 Ibid.' pp. 6, 216.
28 Ib'd
l. • ' p. 10 •

29 Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 110; NCA, Vol. 1, p. 895, Vol. 8, pp. 146,
160.

Alan S, Milward speaks of recruitment in Nazi Germany by means

of force and compulsion in Ala.Tl S. Milward, 'lhf! New Order a.'1d the
French :''.£2..nOw:J. ( Oxfo::rd: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 116.

JOIMT, Vol. 15, p, 18.

J?
were identical with those of German workers who were accommodated in
camps.

0

Living conditions were dependent on the circumstances of war,

and in contrast with peacetime, were subject to the same limitations
as applied to the Gennan population. ,Jl

Herr von Schirach testified

for Sauckel on this matter.
Sauckel personally issued orders concerning the camps, but
the Reich Minister of Labor could put them into effect.

The camp leader

and the DAF (Gennan Labor Front) supervised the camps.3 2 The Army was
responsible for prisoner-of-war camps. 33 The Reichsfiiher SS established
the labor correction camps. 34

It was also the task of the Reichs-

fiihrer SS to employ Jews as Sauckel stated.35 Yet later on in his
testimony, Sauckel admitted employing prisoners-of-war.3 6
The total number of foreign workers utilized were five million.37
The employers of labor included the Economic Ministry, the Armament
Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, the various trades , the State
Railways, and the mines.3 8 Hitler was the chief, under hi~ was Spe8r,
31 Ibid.' p. 23.

J2 Ib1d.' p. 25.
))Ibid.' p. 36.
34Ib.d
l. •• p. 39; See also Ibid., pp. 179, 198-99.
J5Ibid.' p. 42; See also Ibid., p. 172.
36 Ibid.' p. 115.
J?Ibid., p. 52.
38 Ibid.' p.
53.

38
and then Sa.uckel.39 Sauckel stated that his office had to meet the
40
demands ma.de by Speer,
Again, he reiterated that he felt justified
for his role in the Nazi rcgime, 41
Upon cross-examination, Sauckel disagreed with the theory of
when 1 t referred to wars of aggression. He ref'Used to
42
emphasize the idea of the master race.
Concerning the amount of

Le bensratun

force exercised by Hitler over him and thus, his obedience to superior
authority, the Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic, Jacques
B, Herzog asked:

I will read it once more: ",,,I agree with all the decisions
taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used
and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I
collaborated, actively in the execution of this plan," I
ask you to confirm whether you made these statements,

To this Saucker replied&
I certainly would not have made those statements in the way I
did, if I had been able to act freely and according to my
own will,43
44
Sauckel acknowledged that he followed Hitler's orders.

'!hen, Sauckel asserted that Speer agreed or demanded that

workers should be put at his disposal,

He admitted that they did not

39speer admitted this in his trial.. (See IMT, Vol. 16, p,
479.) Milward pointed out that ultimate responsibility rested with
the Fiihrer in Mil ward, The New Order, p • 1?6 •
40
IMT, Vol, 15, p. ,54.
41'Ibid.' p,

55,

42 Ibid.' p. 62.
43 Ibid.' p. 66.
44
Ibid. ' p. 82 •

agree on everything such as the protected factories in France. 45
When Sauckel was not successful in satisfying demands for workers,
"Speer'z orders took priority."

46

M• Jacques B. Herzog questioned Sauckel again.

He asked him

whether he thougtt that it was a correct procedure to hand over foreign
workers to the Gestapo and to concentration camps.

Sauckel believed

that serious offenses such as continued lack of worker responsibility
warranted this action. 47 Sauckel explained that, "with a good conscience, I gained knowledge here of the cruelities which were committed in the concentration camps."48 However, the Prosec:..ition brought
forward a picture of Sauckel in Buchenwald which he could not recali. 49
The Russian prosecutor, Alexandrow, appeared vezy firm in his
questioning of Sauckel.50 The President ordered Alexandrow not to
argue with him. 5l

Then, Sauckel proceeded to answer the prosecutor,

saying that, if he knew his actions were a crime, he would never have
exercised those responsibilities.52 Again, Sauckel contradicted himself and stated that he "did not employ prisoners-of-war ... 53 Similar
4 5Ibid., p. 112.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.' p. 120.
48
Ibid., p. 121.
49 Ibid., p. 122.
50ibid., p. 143.
5i!bid.' p • 145.

.52Ib·d
l. • ' p. 150.
<:J
j

Cf. !MT, Vol. 15, p. 115 and p. 1_54.

to Speer but not quite as believable, Sauckel throughout his trial said

that he wanted to remain faithfUl to the Gf,rman people and their welfare.
Sauckel asserted that he did not bear the responsibility of
looking after the workers.

His job consisted of "getting workers for

the industries.".54 The police, military, and civilian operations
recruited workers as S~uckel testified--55 a statement which contradieted the task under his very title.
Several witnesses ali;:.o testified.

Max Timm, who worked in the

Reich Labor Ministry in the Allocation of Labor department, and head
of the European Office, stated that Sauckel handled administrative
matters in an orderly fashion, being known for his friendliness to
ci.vil servants. 56 Timm ad.mi tted that Speer was Sauckel' s superior. 57
Another witness, Hubert Hildebrandt, who was serving in the Reich
Viinistry of Labor from 1930 onward, dealt with questions of labor
for the iron and metal industries, the chemical and textile industries.
After 1940, Hildebrandt dealt with questions concerning
West •.58

workf~rs

He acknowledged that compulsory labor was used..59

in the

Jager,

a doctor entrusted with the medical care of the camps of foreign workers
and employed for Krupp in Essen, stated that "the workers' clothing was
.54Ibid.' p. 199,
55Ibid.' p. 20?.

56Ibid.' p. 208.
5?Ibid.' p • 223.

.58 Ibid.' p. 232.
59 lbid.

poor,"

60 Several other witnesses did not show. 61 With that note,

Sauckel's trial ca.me to a close.

In perspective it is evident that Sauckel took his assignment
for granted as an honor bestowed upon him, seemingly without scruples
of any grave consequences.

However, recruiting labor appeared like a

difficult undertaking to him,

He announced his program in a memorandum

on 20 April 1942:
All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in
such a way that With the least possible outlay the
greatest possible results will be achieved.62
'Ihe recruiting drive started out somewhat humane and worsened
to a considerable degree because there was not enough habitable space
available.

"Sauckel either was unaware of much of what went on or

ignored it. 1163
Workers were paid a mark or two a week, but their pay varied
from time to time owing to deductions.

'Ihe hours also varied but

usually a thirteen-hour day was the custom. Workers could also be
64
beaten for stealing a crumb of bread.
Their production varied between
sixty-five percent and one-hundred percent of that of the German workers. 65

60
61

Ibid.' pp. 272-7.3.
Ibid.' p. 28J.

62 IMT, Vol. 25, p. 69, (016-PS); NCA, Vol. 1, p. 876; (See also
Appendix A for more documentary evidence on Sauckel; Office of United
States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. A. [Washington, D. c.: Government
Prirrting Office, 1947. J ; and fil1!_, Vol. 8. ) Fbr the evidence on foreign
labor in general, consult NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 875-948.
6 3~vidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 507.

64NCA, Vol. 7, pp. 1)-14, (D-J05).

65IMT, Vol. 27, p. 594, (17.39-PS)
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Another harsh measure resulted in workers being exploited to the uttennost for the benefit of the Reich. 66

Even eight-year-olds could

be drafted when they seemed either dangerous or a nuisance to the
Gennan occupa.nts. 67

A milder but well-planned measure for the benefit

of maintaining the morale of the workers demanded that the undernourished
receive medicine and food and good care for they "must be given the
feeling it is to their own interest to work loyally for Gennany."

68

Eugene Davidson stated that Sauckel organized "protection
squad , " mixed groups of local police and his own employers, in order
to get the workers in the West,

His henchmen would sometimes sur-

round churches or moving-picture threaters, corralling hundreds of
prisoners at one time. 69
I. G. Farbfm.

Sauckel also made use of foreign workers for

70

In the span of one year from April, 1942 until April, 1943,
Sauckel rounded up J,6)8,056 workers of all descriptions for the
German economy with an additional 622 ,829 prisoners-of-war.'"1

Towv,:rd

the end of the war, labor has hard.er to get,, resulting in severer
methods. 72

Another document revealed that the workers toiled in the

66 Ibid., Vol. 26, pp. 482-J, (410-EC),
67Ibid., Vol. ),

p.

448, (R-10J),

68 Ibid,, Vol, 14, p, 6J2.
69 navidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 511.
?Oibid.

71 _,
IMT Vol. J, p. 484; NCA, Vol. 1, p, 909, ( 407-VI-PS).

--·

72 IMT

Vol. 15' pp. 264-8): Vol.

Vol, 6, pp. 1111-12, (D-171).

35,

pp.

55-6, (D-258);

NGA

clothes they came in, and even if they were sick, they were forced to
work. 73

In contrast, a milder measure in the beginning of the war

stated that "Ea.stem workers must be treated decently .......74
Burton

c.

Andrus, the .P-iler at Nuremberg, stated that Sauckel

was "a broken off, sharp-edged spoon." 75 A prison psychologist, Kelly,
found that Sauckel exhibited extremely energetic qual.i ties.

He was

emotionally stable but lacked the intelligence to realize the true
problems of the situation. . Unlike Speer, he was intensely loyal to
Hitler and felt no sense of guilt. 76 The prison psychiatrist, G. N.
Gilbert found that he had an I.Q. of 118; he also showed signs of
anxiety and depression.77 Gilbert judged Sauckel as a "naive realist"
with ''blind faith in Hitler."78

In Sauckel's cell, many times, Gilbert

found him trembling and very defensive.79
Fbr Sauckel's defense, 80 Dr. Servatius pointed out the dif81
ficulty of defining slave labor.
Servatius purported that:
73Ibid., Vol.), pp. 90-99, (054-PS).
74 IMT. Vol. 41, ~P· 218-19, (Sauckel-16): See also l!f!'., 'lol. 41,
pp. 228-40, (Sauckel-84).
75i3urton C. Andrus, The Infamous of Nuremberg (London:
Frewin, 1969), p. 126.

Leslie

76 Ibid.' p. 172.
77Ibid., pp. 100-101.
78 Ibid.
79Gustave Mark Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar Straus &
Co., 1947), pp. 75. 170-71.
80 IMT, Vol. 18, pp. 466-506; Office of United States Chief of
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi ConsPirac ' and A ression,
Supp. B (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948 , pp. 699-740.
81 IMT, Vol. 18, pp. 466-6?.
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The significance of such a violation of the principles that
armament production shall be forbidden lies in the serious
consequence that no fonnation of a generaJ.ly recognized
rule of international law in this new field of ultilization of
manpower can thereby be proven. Under these circtUnstances
therefore Gennany was likewise free to employ workers of the
Soviet Union and workers of all other states in annament production.82
He continued in somewhat the same fashiona
A purely mili tar,r emergency would provide no excuse for
disregarding international law. Victory jeopardized must
not be sought by breaking international law when in
distress. because the laws of warfare are intended to govern
that ver.r combat, which is of necessity connected with distress. International law inclines differently where it is
a case of a measure to be taken to safeguard the existence
of the state. That is a law of self-preservation which
every state is entitled to because higher institutions
are lacking which could protect it from destructions.BJ
\ Dr. Servatius further ex.plained that foreign workers h3.d
already been employed by individual action when Sauckel Kas appointed
to his new office.

Therefore, "he could take it for granted that the

State would equally proceed in a legal manner. 1184 \Yet, Servatius
argued that punishment could be inflicted only if Sauckel kr:.ew that
his actions were catering to an unjust war.

He pointed out that Sauckel

denied such actions, and proof was not evident otherwise. 8

5\

Then, Sauckel's defense counsel pointed out the diffErent
sectors of responsibility. 86
82 Ibid.' p. 47).
BJibid.' p. 476.
84 Ibid.' p. 477.
s5Ibid.' p. 480.

86 Ibid.' p. 498.

In conclusion, Servatius asserted:

In any case one fact clearly speaks in favor of the
Defendant Sauckel, one which has always been confirmed
by competent witnesses, namely, that the workers were
willing and industrious [yet, Sauckel himself admitted
using forced la borers] and that when the collapse came
no uprising occurred in which they would have given
vent to their national wrath against the slaveholders.
I have s\munarized actual happenings and appraised
them juridically. All this, however, must appear to be
juridical quibbling when a higher responsibility is
involved. It has been stated here that it would not
do to let the insignificant works managers take the blame,
and that the moral responsibility must go to the highest
Reich Government officesc On their own initiative they
ought to have introduced corrections on a larger scale to
cope with the difficulties inherent in the circumstances
of that time.87

Sauckel likewise pleaded in his own behalf. 88 He claimed that
he, in spirit, was a simple sailor and worker. 89 His opening words
in his own defense were:
The atrocities revealed in this trial have shaken me in
my deepest soul • In our humlli ty and reverence, I bow
before the victims and those who died, members of all
nations, and before the misery and the sorrow of my own 90
people according to which I myself will make a statement.

Therefore, he stated:
It was never my intention to commit crimes against international law, against the laws of war, or against the
laws of humanity. Not for a single moment did I doubt
the legality and admissibility of my task, for I thought
it completely out of the question that the German
Government would break international law.91

87

Ibid

I

t

p•

.504

O

88 NCA, Supp. B, pp. 740-43.
89 Ibid •• p. 740.

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., p. 742.

l.~6

He believed that he had worked for good conditions, 92 Sauckel
concluded his final plea with the following words:
God protect my beloved people, above all, and may the Lord
bless the work of GP-nna.n workers, for whom I have lived
and struggled, and may he give peace to the world.93
Jackson stated that Sauckel was "the greatest and cruelest
slaver since the Pharaohs of Egypt,"94

The Tribunal delivered its

judgment upon Sauckel195
The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel
was sufficiently connected with the common plan to wage
aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning
or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal
to convict him on Counts One or Two,96
However, they quoted his attitude from a regulation:
"All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure." The evidence shows that
Sauckel was in charge of a program which involved deportation
for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, m~ of
\ them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering,9?

1

The Tribunal thus found Sauckel guilty under Counts Three and Four,
but dismissed the first two counts on grounds of insufficient evidence.

\The

Tribunal sentenced him to death by hanging,98

92 Ibid., PP• 742-43.
93 Ibid.' p. ?11.....).

94Jackson, Numberg Case, p. 143; Gerhart, America's Advocate,
pp. 417-18; IMT, Vol. 19, PP• 415-1?.
95IMT, Vol. 22, pp. 566-68; Office of United States Chief of
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and
A . esslon
inion and Ju ent {Washington, D, C: Government Prlnting
Office, 194? , pp. 146-48. ·~

96 IMT, Vol. 22, p. 566.
97 Ibid.' p. 568 •

98NCA, Opinion and Judgment, p. 190; Il~T, Vol. 1, pp. )66-67,
Vol. 2;:, p • .589.
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The New York Times recorded the events as they happened, and
their record appears to be quite congruent with the sources,

The

evidence against Sauckel and others was implied, 99 The TimP.s reported
that Sauckel was a visitor in Dachau. 100 The French prosecution indicted Sauckel and the others for crimes against humanity, 101
had violated international law by forcing conquered. people

Sauckel

into the

service of the conquerors, showing that the Gennans did not plan to
102
free foreign labor from slavery after the war ended.
When Sauckel took the stand, he admitted. voluntary labor recruitment and then, shanghaiing of labor. 103 The USSR prosecutor
accused Sauckel of USSR forced labor recruitment; he also impliPd
104
that he was a liaison for police terrorists.
Three witnesses
testified· that Sauckel and the labor administration were uninfonned. on
abuses cornraitted against foreign workers. 10.5

99New York Times, 13 Ikcember 194.5, sec, 1' p, 12.
100Ibid.' 12 January 1946, sec. 1 • 2, p, 4,
101Ibid,' 20 January 1946, sec.

),

p. 28.

102Ibid., 19 January 1946, sec,

),

p. 9.

tOJibid., JO May 1946, sec. 2, p. 7,
104Thid,' 1 June 1946, sec, 2, 8, p, .5.
l0.5Ibid., 2 June 1946, sec, 2, p. 34.

CHAJ'TER V

'!HE HEAD OF WAR PRODUCTION AND ARMAMENTS-ALBERT SPEER

The man who put Sauckel • s foreign workers to use 1n the
production and armaments industries in Genna.ny was indicted on all
four counts like Sauckel and many of the other defendants:
The defendant SPEER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions,
Chief of the Organization Todt, General Plenipotentiary
for Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and
Chainnan of the A.nnaments Council. The defendant SPEER
used the foregoing :positions and his personal influence
in such a manner that: He participated in the milita:cy
and economic planning and pre:paration of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes
ac;ainst Humanity set forth in Count Fbur of the Indictment,
including more particularly the abuse and exploitation
of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive war.1

Speer pleaded not guilty to the indictment.

2

He went th.rough the

similar procedures that the Tribunal subjected Sauckel and the other
defendants to undergo.

There was a motion of the prosecution for

correcting discrepancies, an order of the Tribunal regarding notice
to the defend.ants, and constant interrogation.
Speer was born in Mannheim, Germany on 19 l>iarch 1905, the son
1

IMT, Vol. 1, p, 73; NCA, Vol. 1, p. 6Z; New York Tir.es, 19
October 1945, sec. 10, p. 1.
2

!MT, Vol. 1, p. 98; roid., Vol. 2, p. 94.
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and grandson of architects.3

As he testified, Speer took up architecture,

more because of custom rathe!r than inclination.
ln ma.thematics and physics.

He was a first interested

He attended the university at Munich and

Berlin, where, when Hitler took power, he was the first assistant at
the Technische Hochschule at the age of twenty-four.

After his Abitur

essay was judged the best in his class, 4 Speer stated in his Memoirs
that he was "above all an architect" and that his "political interests
played a subsidiary pa.rt"

in his thinking.5

In 1932 he went into

business for himself until 1942. 6
In 19.34 Hitler noticed Speer for the first time.

Speer became

acquainted with him and exercised his architectural functions with
joy and enthusiasm.

Besides building a new Reich Chancellery in

Berlin and various buildings on the Party Rally grounds at Nuremberg,
Sp€er replanned the cities of Berlin and Nuremberg.

Hitler's megalomania

forced him to sketch building plans which would have been among the
largest in the world if put into operation, but time did not permit.
However, he was unable to finish them because of the war.

Speer re-

vealed that "if Hitler had had any friends at all, I certainly would
have been one of his close friends." 7

During his later twenties, Speer attracted Hitler's admiratlon

--·--------

J Ibid., Vol. 16, p, 430; Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, pp. 48586; Hamsher, !!bert Spe~, pp. 6, 15, Memo~-pp. 3-4.
4

Speer, Memoirs, p. 9; Hamsher, Albert Speer, p. 24.

5Speer, Memoirs, p. 21.
6IMT, Vol. 16, p. 430.
7 Tuid.
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as an architect and quite a congenial man.
soul like Faust.

8

"I would have sold my

Now I had found my Mephistopheles.

less engaging than Goethe's."9

"Hitler's spell"

10

He seemed no

had overwhelmed him.

Speer described this situation more in relation to Hitler as if a
mesmerizing hypnotism had taken hold of hims
For five years I lived in this world of plans, and in
spite of all their defects and absurdities I still cannot entirely tear myself away from it all. When I look
deep into myself for the reasons for my present hatred of
Hitler, I sometimes think that in addition to all the
terrible things he perpetrated I should perhaps include
the personal disappointment his wanna.king brought to me;
but I also realize that these plans could only have
sprung from his unscrupulous game of power. Iesigns of
such scale naturally indicate a kind of chronic megalomania which is reason enough to dwell on these
grandiose plans ••••• 11
In another of the many instances, Speer characterized Hitler
as containing "a multitud8 of selves, from a person deeply
awa.re of his responsibilities all the way to a ruthless and manhating nihilist."

12

The Tribunal called Speer to the stand on Wednesday, 19 June
1946.

His trial ended the 21 June 1946, the one-hundredth-and sixtirtr.

8Speer, Memoirs, p. 31.
9Ibid.; See also "Hitlerand.His Architect," Times Literary
Suppleme.nt 68 (October 16, 1969): 1173-74; J, Barkas, 'Face
to Face with the Planner of the Third Reich," Contemporar:L Revie11
222 (February 1973): 72-77.

10
Speer, Memoirs, p. 49.

11 ro1d., p. 1J8.
12 Ibid., p. 173; See also Hamsher, .@.bert Speer, p. 70.
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day of the Tribunal in session. l3

Speer declared that he did not

parti.cipate in the planning and preparation of an aggressive war.
He was active as an architect until 1942.

"The buildings which I

constructed were completely representative of peacetime buildings, 014
said Speer.

Then, Speer described the incident which made him Minister

of Annaments:

On 8 February 1942, my predecessor, Dr. Todt, was killed in an
an airplane crash. Several days later Hitler declared I was to
be his successor in his many offices. At that time I was 36
years of age, Up until that time, Hitler considered the main

activity of Todt to be in the building sphere, and that is
why he called me his successor, I believe that it was a complete
surprise to everyone when I was called to office as a Minister,
Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be
seen that not builCling but the intensification of annaments
was to be my main task, for the heavy losses of material
in the battles in Russia during the winter of 1941-42 was
a great blow. Hitler called for considerable intensification
of annament productions,15
Speer had the burden of building up an organization which Todt
had somewhat neglected.

First, Speer had to familiarize himself with

a completely new field.

Secondly, he had to create all organizational

prerequisites for his task.

Thirdly, responsibility lay with him for

restoring the decreasing armament production for the Anny plus the
responsibility for increasing production as much as possible within
the next few months,

Speer succeeded in doing that. 16

13 IMT, Vol. 16, pp. 429-591.
14Thid. t p, 4J1.
l 5Ibid. , p. 432; See also Speer, Memoirs, p. 193; Hamsher,
Albert Speer, pp. 110-11; Davidson, Trial of the ~mans, p, 19; Homze,

rbreir:n Labor, p. 87.

16IMT, Vol. 16, p. 432.

Dr. Hans F.Ui.chsner, Speer's defense counsel, asked him to describe
his tasks.

Speer replied that his tasks included the surmounting of

the inadequate supply of raw materials,

metal~,

and steel, the sys•

tematizing of work by the introduction of assembly-line techniques,
and the amplifying of the production programs for such things as fine
steel, aluminum, and individual parts like ball bearings and gear wheels.
One of his most important tasks was the development of new weapons
and their serial production.

Then, Speer had to repair the damages

caused by the extraordinarily sudden bombing attacks, which forced him
to work with improvised means and methods. l 7 One of his main tasks
dealt with exercising state control over the distribution of orders.

18

In 1942, when Speer took over the armaments and construction
programs, he had 2.6 million workers.

In the spring of 194.3, D:mitz

entrusted hin with naval armament as well.

'Ih:rough an agreement with

thf; I'.inister of Economy, Herr Funk, Speer controlled the production
of the Ministry of Economy in September of 1943.

now had 12 million workers.

As a result Speer

•'
On 1 August 1944 Garing
turned over the

air armament production to Speer.

'Ihe total number of workers went

up to 14 million, including foreign and German alike.

These workers

did not include those working in the occupied countries. 19
Next, Speer listed the different divisions and responsibilities
of each sector.

The Food Ministry and the various offices connected

17Ibid., p. 436.
18Ib"d
1 • , p. 437.
19 Ibid.
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with it were responsible for the food supply.

The occupation-super-

vising agencies in the Reich Labor Ministry maintained the conditions
in the Reich for the workers,

The Trustees of Labor, worlting under

the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment, were responsible for the
salaries and the quality and quanity of work done.

The Health Office

of the Reich Ministry of the Interior tried to care for the heaJ.th of
the workers by establishing set conditions.

Furthermore, the Justice

~partmcnt

and the Police Department settled labor disputes and punished

violations.

FinaJ.ly, the Germ.an Labor Front represented the interests

of labor with the employers, 20
Speer stated that Sauckel's task was finished with the recruiting of workers for the industries.

But he argued that the

employment of workers in industry itself had to be a matter of manager
concern and that this could not be influenced by the labor office.
Yet, Speer testified that Sauckel was partly responsible for supervising labor conditions.

21

He continued to state that the works'

managers found it impossible to carry through Sauckel' s decrees at
times for reasons which were outside their power.

Moreover, the

bombing attacks brought about difficulties such as disorganizing transportation or destroying living quarters especiaJ.ly in the summer of 1944.
During these catastrophic times, the Reich authorities assl.Ulled the
greater responsibility. 22
20 Ibid.' p. 4J8'.

21 Ibid,

22 Ibid., p. 4J9.

When workers violated labor discipline, Speer considered it
just that punishment should be handed out, but he did not demand
supplementary measures, He believed that the workers would yield
,
,
23
sufficient output if he kept on good terms with them.

One of the directives that referred to Speer's humane conduct
of affairs was Speer Directive Number 11.

It df".Jllanded that "the

Russians under all circumstances were to receive sufficient food
and that civilian Russians were not to be put behind barbed wire and
be treated as prisoners of war," 24

Speer defended himself, when Dr. F1achsner asked whether he
applied means of terror and brutality so that the achievements of the
compulsory workers would be increased. 2 5 He did not approve of increased
productivity through very severe compulsory measures such as using
SS and Police against recalcitrant workers. 26

Even though Speer disagreed with Sauckel on matters, he thanked
him for supplying laborers. 2 7

He was at odds with Sauckel in the

middle of 1943 over production and the insufficient availability of
ZJibid,
24Ibid,, p, 440; See Appendix D for more documentary evidence

on Speer.
Z5IMT, Vol. 16, p. 446.

26

Ibid.' pp. 446, 457.

27 Ibid., p. 447; See also Homze, Fbreign Labor, pp. 204-229;

Testimony of Albert Speer, Industrial l-bbiliza.tion and Design an£
~welopment of Aircraft in Gennany (Washington, D. c.: Aircraft
Industries Association, n. d.), pp. 30-31; Milward, New C.rci~.r, p, 179.
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German labor reserves.

28

But he stated in his Memoirs that he shared

the responsibility for Sauckel' s "dire labor policies. 112 9 He was
al ways in basic agreP..ment with his mass deportations of foreign labor

to Germany,

Speer described the ineffectiveness of the Gennan ad-

ministration in thf:: occupied territories.JO

"Thus, from the start

of my work as Minister of Armaments, I discovered blunder after blunder,
in all departments of the economy, 1131 One can see that Speer continuously fought for better administrative methods, and his antagonism
with Sauckel was part of this struggle.
A

very important part of Speer's trial dwelt on the concept

of "armaments".

Speer related1

The concept of "annaments" was in no way restricted to that
sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war
agreement, The modern concept of "armaments" is a much
more comprehensive one, It includes a much wider sphere of
activity. There were no basic principles set down for
our concept of "armaments," The characteristic of an
armament factory was that as an intermediary authority,
the Annament Inspectorate took care of it and watched
over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production
of raw steel belonged to armament; all rolling mills, foundries
and forges, the production or the manufacture of aluminum and
modern synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wood; the
manufacture of individual items, the use of which in armaments
cannot be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as
ball bearings gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth,
or the prod.uction of tool machinery, the setting up of
assembly lines; similarly the manufacture of motor cars and
the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships, and also
textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather
goods or wooden wares,
28 IMT, Vol. 16, p, 447.

29Speer, Memoirs, p, 219.
JOibid,, pp. 219-JO,
)!Ibid,, p. 229; See also Homze, Foreign Labor, p, 2?6.
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In the interrogatories, which I sent to my witnesses,
I tried to have stated what percentages of the Geman annament
industries produced armaments as defined by the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give you the figures. My coworkers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20 percent of
our armament program was concerned with the production of
weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equipment which the various branches of the Armed Fbrces required.
The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the
sense of the C'1€neva Convention. The reason for the expansion
of the concept of "armament" in Germany was besides manufacturing reasons, the preferential treatment which applied
to these industries, a trea. tment which resulted in munerous
industries clamoring to be called anna.ment industries.32

Speer said that the Krupp Works were an excellent example of a factory
with a fraction of its production used for war equipment.33

Further-

more, Speer admitted knowing the Geneva regulations and believed that
he did not go against them.3 4 However, he did not check the laws
concerning recruited labor by force.35
The fomer Minister of Amaments related the functions of the
Organization 'l'odt which were exclusively technical ones.

It had to

carry out technical construction work; in the East, particularly road
and rail construction, and the construction of concrete dugouts in
the West.

The Organization Todt used foreign labor to i.ts fullest.3 6

It supplied its own technical staff and recruited its own workers by
voluntary means.

But Speer acknowledged that a certain percentagi::

of the workers operated under the conscription system.37
32 IMT, Vol. 16, p. 449.
33 Ibid., pp. 449-50.
34 Ibid.' p. 451.
J5Ibid.

36 Ibid.,

p. 470.

37Ibid.' pp. 470-71.
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At a meeting of the Central Planning Board with Sauckel present,
Speer stated:
We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that
the sicklist decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in
factories where doctors are on the staff who are
examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said
against SS and police ta.king drastic steps and putting
those known as slackers into concentration camps, There
is no alternative, Let it happen several times and the
news will ~;oon go round,38
He contradicted himself in the courtroom on this matter of using
concentration camp workers,39

Then, Dr. Flachsner gave Speer the opportunity to confinn
or to deny some of Sauckel's testimony:
Dr. Flachsner: [Youha.ve heard that Sauckel, in giving his
tesM..mony on JO May 1946] , said that GOring participated in the meetings of the Central Planning Board.
Is t.ha t true?

Speer: No, that is in no way correct. I would not have
had any use for him, for after all, we had to carry out
practical work.

Dr. Flachsner: The Prosecution has submitted a statement
by Sauckel dated 8 October 1945, according to which
arrangE!ments for his delegates to function in the occupied
territories were supposed to have been made by you. Is
that true?
Speer: No. In 1941 I had not yet anything to do with
ann.ament; and even later, during the period of Sauckel's
activity, I did not appoint these delegates and did
not do much to promote their activities. That was a
40
matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction.
Speer also disagreed with other statements.
JSNCA, Vol. 1. pp. 898-99, 937, (R-124).
39Cf. If1'!'., Vol. 16, p. 472 and p. 475.
40 IM'£, Vol. 16, p. 479.
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Labor Allocation Iepartment was further mentioned by
Sa.uckel in his testimony. 'Ibis worked as follows:
FNery large factory and every employer of labor had an
allocation department which, naturally, ca.me under mine.
None of these departments, however, encroached in the
slightest degree of Sauckel' s tasks. '!heir sphere of
activity was not very great, as may be seen from the fact
that each was one of 50 or 60 departments coming under
my office. If I had attached very much importance to it,
it would have been one of my six or eight branch offices.
Sauckel further mentional the Sta.bsleiter
discussions which took place in his office. A representa.tive of my Labor Allocation Department for Amy and
Navy anna.ment and for building attended these conferences.
At these meetings, which were attended. by about 15 people
who were in need of labor, the question of priority was
settled on the basis of Sauckel's information on the
state of economy generally. 'Ihese were really the
functions erroneously ascribed. here to the Central Planning

Ny

Board.
In addition it was asserted that I promoted
the transport of foreign workers to Gemany in April
1942 and that I was responsible for the fact that foreign
workers were brought to Gemany at all. That, however,
is not true. I did not need to use any inf1uence on
Sauckel to attain that. In any case, it is evident from
••
a docUI!lent in my possession--the minutes of a FUhrer
conference of 3 May 1942--that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region was approved by the
Fuhrer at Sauckel's suggestion.
I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on
18 April 1942, showing that at that period I was still
of the opinion that the German building industry, which
employed approximately 1.8 million workmen was to be
discontinued to a large extent to divert the necessary
labor to the production of armaments. This speech which
I made to my staff; in which I explained my principles
and also discussed. the question of manpower does not
contain any mention of the planning of a foreign labor
draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans,
surely I would have mentioned the subject in this speech.
Finally, in connection with Sauckel's testimony, I
must correct the plan of the organization submitted here.
It is incorrect in that the separate sectors enumerated
in it are classified under various ministries. In reality
these sectors of employers of labor were classified
undervarl.ous economic branches, independently of the
ministries. They only t:orresponded. where my own Ministry
and the Air Ministry were concerned.
It is also incorrect in stating that the building
industry was represented in the Ministry of Economics.

..
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1h:Lt cane under my jurisdiction, From 1943 on, the
chemical and mining industries, both of which are listed
under the Ministry of Economics, were under my jurisdiction, To my Jr...nowledge, these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Fbur Year Plan
even prior to September 1943 and stated their requirements
directly to Sauckel independently of the Ministry of
Economics,
This plan further is incorrect in stating that
the demand for these workers from individual employers
went directly to Hitler. It would have been impossible
for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers,
As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter
conferences, over which Sauckel presided, 41
Furthermore, Speer declared that he "never made statements regarding
ideology, anti-Semitism, et cetera. 1142 Nor did Speer appeal to superior
orders to save him, but assumed his share of responsibility for
catastrophes before the Gennan people, 43
Speer statc...>d that Hitler deceived all of the people "by holding
out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of diplomatic
steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victorious battles
by

means of new troops and new weapons,"

Speer referred to his

speeches through which he opposed Hitler on such matters. 44

"In

Hitler's own end he [Hitler] .saw the end of the German. people and
risked their lives as well."4-5 Probably the Tribunal was more lenient
on

Spe~r

41

because he had opposed Hitler, even plotting to kill him many
Ibid. ' pp. 480-81 •

42

Ibid. , p, 481 ; Homze says , that in Sauckel' s plans , there was
"racialism," in Homze, Foreign Labor, p. 127, However, "the longer
the war dragged on, the less important racial considerations became."
(See Ibid., p. 276.)

43 D1T, Vol, 16, p, 483,
44Ibid.' p. 485.
4 5Ibid., p. 493; See also Speer,

M~moirs, p. 293.
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times,

On one occasion he wanted to introduce gas into the ventilator

of the air-conditioning plant, which was in the garden of the Reich
Chancellery,

In the middle of February 1945, Speer sent for Stahl,

the head of Speer's main department.

He had worked in close co-

operation with him during the time in order to obtain a new poisionous
gas which was only effective when made to explode at a high temperatm:•!,
However, an explosion was not possible since the air-conditioning
plant was made of thin sheets of tin, which would have_ been torn to
pieces by the explosion.

As a result, Speer arranged to have the

antigas filter switched off more than normal by Hanschel, the chief
engineer of the Chancellery,
gas.

He could then use the ordinary type of

Hanschel remained unaware of Speer's purpose.

When

the time

came for putting his plan to work, SpeHr discovered that on Hi tlcr' s
personal order this ven·tilator had recently been surrounded by a
chimney four mPters high, Hence, his plan ended in failure. 46
Upon cross-examination, Speer acknowledged before Jackson and
the Tribunal that he had known of the Ffuirer's decision to approve all
coercive measures f'or obtaining labor if they could not be obtained
on a voluntary basis,

He admitted that he did not give any particular

attention to the legal. side, and that he was after manpower.

He br:licw;d

that all the violations of international law had already

corimitv::

before he took office. 47

bE:Hi

More than any of the other prosecutors, thr,

Russian prosecutor, M, Y, Raginsky, (and the other Russians for that

46 rz.rT, Vol. 16, p. 495; Hamsher, Alb~'rj:. Spee!, pp. 178-85.

47 IMT, Vol. 16, p. 521,
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matter) seemed to be more prejudiced against Speer. 48
William Hamsher stated that important documents were not
available for Speer's trial, but they finally showed up.

Nevertheless,

Speer did not know whether they would have helped him. 49 In his
Memoirs, Speer stated that .Sauckel had tried to make a better case
for himself by labeling him as solely responsible for the importation
of foreign workers.· 50 He confessed that he had contradicted himself
when he said that he had never read Mein Kampf .51
Davidson stated that Speer highly approved of concentrationcamp labor for his war industries.

He al.so

us~

prisoners-of-war,

volunteers, and forced laborers.
In his countless reports, memoranda, and speeches, he advocated
that they be adequately fed and rewarded for their perfonnance.
In the environment of hostility and violence in which he
operated, he was one of the mildest of the top government officials. He believed that evezy Ge man should do his or
her part."52
As

a :result of Speer's efforts, Geman war production boomed especially

toward. the end of his ministzy in 1944-45.
Alan S. Milward stated that "Speer had pl.ans for a peaceful.

solution to the war which envisaged a Europe reconstructed on lines
no:t u.Tllike the present Common Market •.. 53
48

His predecessor, Todt, began

Ibid., pp • .582-84.

49Hamsher, Albert Speer, pp. 222-23.

c:o

./ Speer, Memoirs, p. 508. Sauckel, Gilbert found, was angzy at
Speer for having put him in a bad light with respect to slave labor.
(See Gilbert, Nurf',mberg Diary, p. 394.)

.51speer, Memoirs, p. 509.
52Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 495.
53Milward, New Order, p. 28.
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the reorganization of the German war economy,

He abandoned the

Blitzkrieg and geared the German economy to a :full-scale war.

After

Todt's death his successor continued his work with even greater zeal •.54
Speer increased German aircraft production, but was reluctant to
utilize French capacity too far since assurance of enthusiastic work
done in an occupied country could not be guaranteed,55 In 1941 Gemany
moved away f'rom the idea of plunder to the idea of an organized
exploitation of the French economy.

In 1942 the Geman government

abandoned the Blitzkrieg economic strategy and advocated increased
exploitation,56 By the autumn of 1942, out of 5,093,000 workers in
the Gennan Reich, 1,341,000 were French.57 Speer believed the French
workers were more efficient than others,

Yet, the Russian women

were the best laborers of them all, 58
'Ihe Tribunal pointed out much of the e.vidence against Speer,
Sauckel, and other Nazi leaders in "The Slave Labor Program, 'Ihe
TI.legal Use of Prisoners of War, and the Special Responsibility of

Sauckel and Speer Therefor •..59

'Ihe opening words appear as follows:

In general. terms, the basic elements of the Nazi foreign
labor policy consisted of mass deportation and mass enslavement.
It was a policy of underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers,
of subjecting them to eveey fonn of degradation and brutality,

54 Ibid. ,

p • 78.

55 Ibid., pp. 8 6-7.
56 Ibid., p. 109.
57 Ibid, f pp. 112-13
58 Ibid., p. 274.

I

59NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 875-948; Ibcumentary listing on pp, 940-48.
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It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and prisoners
of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other operations
of war directed against their own countries, It was, in short,
a policy which constituted a f1agrant violation of the laws
of war and the laws of humanity.
Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer are principally
responsible for the formulation of this policy and for
its execution, Sauckel the Nazis Plenipotentiary General
for Manpower, directed recruitment, deportation, and
allocation of foreign civilian labor. Sanctioning and
directing the use of force as a means of recruitment,
he was responsj.ble for the mistreatment of the enslaved
millions. Speer--as Reichsminister for Amaments and
Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and member
of the Central Planning Board--bears responsibility for
the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the Ge:man war machine, :fbr the decision to
recruit by force, and for the use and brutal treatment of
foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture of
a:mamrmts and munitions, in the construction of fortifications, and in active military operations.
Hermann Goering, as Plenipotentiary General for the
Four Year Plan, is also responsible for all the crimes
involved in the Nazi slave labor program. In addition,
Alfred Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the Occupied
Ba.stem Territories, Hans Frank as Govemor General. of
the Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as
Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands, and
William Keitel as chief of the OKW share responsibility for
the recruitment by force and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or subjugated by the Weh:macht.60
Sauckel not only recruited Russians and Poles, but also Italians,
Dutch, Belgians, Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Balts, Greeks, Luxembourgers,
Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and others as workers, prison•."rs-ofwar, and politicals, totaling 6,691,000. 61
to use as Head of the Armaments Program,

Speer put the foreign workers
The Tribtmal also indicated

60 Ibid, , p. 875 •
61 Ibid., p. 894.

Homze listed as many as 36 million workers
in Germany al together with 12 million foreign workers. (See Homze,
Foreign~. pp. 153, 231.) Other authors differ, but one can estimate
that at least 5 or 6 million foreign workers were employed in Gennany
at the end of the war, with approximately 14 or 15 nillion workers in all.
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that the labor had been taken from concentration camps. 62

It entitled

another section of the evidence, "The Special Responsibility of Sauckel. 1163
It concluded with "The Special Responsibility of Speer."

64 One can

see that Speer confinned the use of prisoners of wa.r. 65 There can be
no doubt that workers ca.me against their own w111. 66
The Prosecution summed up the case against Speer on 8 January
1946:
But unlike Sauckel, Speer's criminal activity went substantially beyong the realm of slave labor. His was
one of the master minds in the plan for the systematic
robbery and SDoliation of the lands overrun by the German
war machines.67
Jackson stated that Speer, however, had opposed the continuance of
war and greatly objected to Hitler's orders to demolish bridges, highways, and factories in order to prevent their falling into Allied
hands. 68 He later said that "Speer was the best man in the dock, in
I think he would have the highest I.Q. and if I were

my opinion.

picking one to acquit, I'd pick Speer on the theor-J that he would do

more for Germany in the reconstruction than any of the othErs,"69
62 NCA, Vol 1. pp. 914-21.
63Ib"d
1 • ' pp. 921-30.

64

Ibid.' pp. 933-40.

65Ib"d
1

66Ib"d
1

• '

p. 933.

• '

p. 936, (3720-PS),

67 IMT, Vol. 4, p. 531.
68
..
Jackson, Nurnberg Case, pp. 254-55.

69Quoting Jackson, in Gerhart, America's Advocate, p, 408,
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A prison psychologist found that Speer was a candid, friendly

personality.

He was more interested in architecture than in the

Trial itself.

He adjusted to the Trial without exercising too much

tension.7°
Speer's defense attorney, Dr. Hans Flachsner, in his final
argum€nt for Speer71 asserted:

We must start, therefore, from the principle that those
areas belonging to signatories of the Hague Convention
on Land Warfare must be judged on a different legal basis
from areas belonging to nonsignatories of the treaty.72
rh moved fo:r acquittal on Counts One and Two because Speer had as-

sumed office a~er aggressive war occurred.7.3

Flachsner stated that

Speer was not responsible for all the mt.asures ordered by Sauckel.74
He further argued that the employment of prisoners-of-war in the industry

of the holding country was not prohibited by the Geneva Prisoners of

War Convention.75
Moreover, the witnesses, Von Poser, KP..mpf, Schieber, Kerl,
Bohland, Seyss-Inquart, and Hirschfeld testified that Speer authorized

non-destruction of industries after the success of the Allied Fbrces.76
Fl.achsner appealed to one Tribunal, indicating that Speer did everything

----·-·--?OAndrus, Infamous of Nurembe.r.g, pp • 172-7.3 •

71 p1T, Vol. 19, pp. 1.77-216; NCA, Supp. B. pp. 895-934,

72 n1T, Vol. 19, p. 180.
73 Jbid.' p. 177.
'71+

' Ibid., p. 190.

75Th'd
. 11. • t p. 199,
761b"d
l. ·•
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in his Power, beginning at the age of thirty-six as Annaments Minister,
to solve the life-and-death dilemma of his country.

''He realized only

too late that Hitler was not thinking of his people, but only of
himself. .. 77 Speer still felt that he was "the servant of his people
and his nation,

Speer had to betray Hitler in order to remain loyal

to his people ... 78
Speer likewise in his final plea79 condemned Hitler just as
"the German people in time will condemn Hitler as the proven originator
of its misery, and despise him •..Bo He had this to say about Hitler
and his dictatorship:
Hitler not only used technical developments to
dominate his own people--he had nearly succeeded, by
means of his technical lead, in subjugating the whole of
Europe. It was merely due to some principal shortcomings
or organization, such as are typicaJ for a dictatorship
because of the absence of criticism that before 1942
he did not have twice as many tanks, aircraft, and submarines,.,.
'Ihe more technical the world becomes the greater
will be this danger and the more serious will be an
established lead in the sphere of the modern means of
warfare,81
Speer further warned against man's use of atomic power.
He concluded with words very pertinent for all posterity:
It is not the battles of war alone which shape the history
of humanity; they are, in a higher sense, the cultural contributions which one day will become the common property
77 Ibid., p. 216.
78 Ibid.

79NCA, Supp, B, p. 934-37
80 Ibid., p. 934.
81 Ibid,' p. 935.
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of all humanity. But a nation believing in its future
will never perish. May God protect Gennany and the
culture of the Occident.82
'!he Tribunal, in its judgment of Speer, found him not guilty
of Counts One and 'l'wo for the following reasons: 83
The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do
not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing wars of
agression, or of conspiracy to that end. He became the
head of the. annament industry well after all of the wars
had been commenced and were under way. His activities in
charge of Gennan annament production were in aid of the
war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not
prepared to find that such activities involved engaging
in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged
under Count One, or waging aggression war as charged under
Count Two.84
On the other hand, the Tribunal found Speer guilty under Counts
'Ihree and Four. 85 They sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. 86
Gilbert stated that Speer was against Hitler's "scorched earth"
policy, 87

Unlike Sauckel, who cried at the sentence (and probably
88
anybody would at death) which he did not consider fair)
Speer

1 aughed nervously since it seemed fail enough. 89

During all this timf;,

82 Ibid., pp. 936-)7.
83n1T, Vol. 22, pp • .576-79; NCA, Opinion and JudgmE"nt, pp. 156-59.
84n1T, Vol. 22, p.

577.

85Ib"d
J. • ' pp. 579, 589.
86Ib.d
J. • , p. 589; NCA, Qpinion and Judgment.J p, 190; Il1T, Vol. 1 ,
PP. ~566-67.

8 7Gilbert, Psychology of Dictatorship, pp. 2}4-J5.
88 Gu bert, Nuremberg Dl;y:y, p.

s9Ibid.

43 J.
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he expressed constant concern for the German people 90 and did not
deny his guilt. 91

Speer stated that "I don't want to make myself any

prettier than I am, ..92
'Ihe lfow York Times reported that Speer, upon taking the stand
.on 19 June 1946, said that he served his country as "a business man
and not as a fanatical Nazi." 93 He said that he had handled the task
"as if it was done in the United States by bringing in the best men
that he could find in German industry.

I am responsible to my con-

science and the German people."94
"Speer Alleges He Planned to Kill Hitler By Throwing Ga.s
'Ihrough Air-Raid Bunker" appeared in an article in the New York Times
on 21 June 1946. 95

" [The

gas] could not be used because it had

to reach a high temperature and the explosion would have wrecked the
air-conditioning plant.9 6 He aJ.so said that "a chimney had also
spoiled the pl_ot and the plan had been dropped • .,9 7 Noveover, he believed
that Hitler betrayed the German poople by continuing the war
90 Ibid., p. 104.
91 Ibid,' p. 167.
92 Ibid.
93New York Times, 20 June 1946, sec.
94Ibid.
95Ibid,, 21J.une1946, sec. 2, p. 9.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.

J,

p. 13.
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January
__ of'

.

prisonm< nt.

191.~5.

98

Thr Tribunal sentenced Speer to twenty years im-

Hence, one can see that the New York Times are quite

consistent in matching the sources, (even though the distance was far

wtvm con.'l11mication can often get mixed up and authenticity may lose
some of its flavor).
On

30 September 1966 Speer was released from Spandau Prison

in Berlin aJ.ong with Baldur von Schirach, the former Youth Leader
of the German Reich.

Speer believed that the Nuremberg TriaJ. was

(-ssentiaJ., 99 and that he had received a just sentence. 100

98 Ibi'd., 2 0 c t·ob er, 1946 , sec. 8 , p. 1 •

99Hamsher, Albert Speer, p, 64.
100Ib'd
1 •

,

p. 6 •

CHAPTER VI
'IHE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

'Ihe Nuremberg Trials are thirty years old, but the moral, legal
aspects remain with us.

~

Writers have discussed such questions as

post facto laws, superior orders, Allied aggression, justice, and ad
hoc establishments, political manipulation, and victors v. vanquished
when viewing the Nuremberg Trials.

Many spoke out in defense of Nur-

emberg, but others were more acrimonious in their animadversions.
Congressional opposition increased in the U.S. after the
Tribunal concluded its operation.
out again;

Bitter partisan politics flamed

the advent of the Cold War caused much criticism of Nurem-

berg and in general dissent arose among the American people,

Some

claimed that the Trials were mismanaged. 1 Yet, the majority of tht·
American people believed that justice reigned. 2 The New York Times
also championed the Trials}

At the same time the twelve subsequent

trials of "Nazi War Criminals" continued from 1946 until 1949. 4 The
Control Council of Germany proceeded to enact Law ?;umber 10 which

gav~

1Bosch, Judgment oo Nuremberg, pp. 81-2.
2

Ibid.' pp. 91-4.

)Ibid., p. 99; New York Times, 1October1946, sec. 1, p. 1.
4

Silvergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine," p. 2; Davidson, ?rial of
of the Germans, pp. 28-9.

70

71
the four Zone Commanders the power to designate tribunals for the
punishment of other "war criminals," basing their crimes on the Nuremberg precedent.

This law did not apply to the British zone. 5 In

Tokyo, Japan, the trial resembled in general the Nuremberg precedent.

6

The Tokyo Tribunal was composed of members from eleven nations. 7
Jewish newspapers and periodicals abhorred the "lenient" sentences
given at Nuremberg.

8

q

'lhe Protestants in general defended Nuremberg.;

Most American lawyers favored the work of the Tribunal, and 75 percent
of the articles and literature since have leanings toward Nuremberg. 10
'lhe majority of texts, on the other

hand, found faults with its work, 11

And American historians have criticized Nuremberg, ho1tever there are
some that defended its justice. 12
One of the biggest ,scandals of justice was the Russian role
in the Trials.

They should not have been allowed to participate in

the Trials at all. On 23 August 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed
in the Kremlin. 13 Superficially drawn up as a Non-Aggression Pact,

~augham, U.N,O. and War Crimes, p, 19.
6

Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 232,

7Ibid •• p. 228
8
Bosch, Jud.gment on Nuremberg, p, 118.
I

9Ibid., p, 120,
10 Ibid.' pp, 144-47.
11 Ibid.' p. 16).
12 Ibid., p. 164.
13 Brinton, et al., History of Civilization, pp, 431-)2.
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under which Germany and Russia pledged themselves to give no assistance
to each other's

em~mies

in the event of war, it included secret clauses,

unknown to the outside world at the time.

However, these secret clauses,

being suspected by other nations, divided eastern Europe into clearly
demarcated German and Russian spheres of influence.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact permitted Hitler to take action against
western Poland and Lithuania.

Stal.in could then take estern Poland,

Latvia,

Thus, this Pact was greatly responsible

l~stonia,

and Finland.

for the success of Hitler's war.
Perhaps Eugene Davidson has described the flaws of Nuremberg,
Stal.in's crimes, and other Al.lied atrocites in the best light:
The Nuremberg doctrines did not and do not reflect the
actual practices of states and statesmen. The trials
were fatal.ly flawed from the beginning, from before the
beginning they were trial.s of the vanquished brought before the courts of the victors. No one in the world,
neither Messrs. Roosevelt, Stimson, Jackson, nor the
whole Nuremberg bench, could have dreamed of C.Omrade
Stal.in's being brought to judgment before any imaginable
court for his invasion of Finland in 1939, al.though the
League of Nations had declared it an act of aggression
and ousted the Soviet Union from its membership, The
expulsion took place during the period of the HitlerStal.in Pact, when the Soviet Union was regarded as an
accomplice of National Social.1st Gennany. The German
defendants had been accused of having waged or conspired to wage, aggressive war against Poland, but no
witness in the course of the great trial was permitted
~o point out that the Polish campaign had been waged with
the complicity of the Soviet Union, which divided Poland
with the Third Reich a few weeks after the Germans invaded.. No Italian was tried by the Allies for invading
France in 1940 or Greece in 1941. Italy was regarded
as a co-belligerent by the Allies after she declared war
on Germany on October 1J, 1943, al.though she had gone to
war as a member of the lliropean Axis. The Nuremberg
Court dealt with crimes of enormous magnitude committed
by National Social.1st Germany: the killing of between
5 and 6 million Jews, the mistreatment of millions of
Russian prisoners of war, f eve,n though Stalin never

...

~
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admitted there were Soviet prisoners-of-wa~J deportation
of civilian populations and their forced labor, often
under inhuman conditions. But it dealt with the crimes
of only the one country, and along with crimes that every
legal code in the ci vllized world regarded as punishable,
it stigmatizes as the chief crime of aggression--which
should perhaps be a crime in a better trorld but had no
legal basis as such in this one, It would be difficult
to maintain, even before a Western court, that the Soviet
leaders, when they ordered their tanks into action in
Hu..'lgary i.n 19 56 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968 , had any
criminal. intent. They were doing what they considered
essential to preserve Soviet hegemony in a vital area,
harsh as the fate of the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks may
have been in their morally justified struggle for independence, their revolts could readily have triggered a
world conflict.14
Furthennore, the immense Allied bombing of Gennan cities such as
Dresden15 was equally as abhorre.nt.
Francis Biddle, one of the American judges at Nuremberg, later
told of the Katyn Forrest Massacre:
The Katyn Woods incident was typical of the Russian
attitude. The inclusion in the indictment of the
allegation that the Germans had massacred eleven
thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forrest, on the
banks of the Dnieper near Smolensk, was dictated solely
by political considerations. Since there was no evidence
that any defendant was remotely connected with the
killings, the charge was irrelevant. Although he had
not seen the reports indicating that the Russians themselves might be guilty, Jackson sensed trouble, and did
his best to persuade them to omit the charge. But
Rudenko jnsisted on including it, leveling the charge
against Gbering as the highest-ranking officer among
the defend.ants ••••• 16
An International Medical Commission examined the corpses 0r.

14na.vidson, Nuremberg Fallacy, pp. 285-86.
1.5Idem, Dea.th and I,ife of Ge:rm~, p. 66. Davidson also
discussed the Russian plunder of cities as they entered GE:n~a.ny.
(See Ibid., p. 74.)
16 Francis Biddle, "Nuremberg: The Fall of the,
AmPrican Hcri:tage 12 (August 19620: 69-70.

Supel."7'.";i:-n,"
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29 and 30 April 1953, finding pistol bullets in the back of many of
the necks. 17 Accordingly, why did the Tribunal allow the Germans to
take the blame for this incident?
out at the time.

They definitely should have spoken

A committee of the U.S. House of Representatives

in 1952 left little doubt that the Soviet NKVD had been guilty of the
Katyn killings in order "to eliminate all Polish leaders who subsequently would have opposed the Soviet's pla.p for communizing Poland," 18
The Russians should have been on trial for this massacre, charged
with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

It is evident that they

definitely were on the wrong side of the bench in the Nuremberg courtroom.

Yet, one can not dismiss other Allied atrocities,

The best

solution most probably would have been trial of the Germa."ls by neutrals,
Before the start of the Trial at Nuremberg, Gering' s lawyer,
Dr. Otto Stahmer presented a "Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel"

on 19 November 1945, 19 He argued that a state has a right to wage
war "by virtue of its sovereignty" at any time and for any purposf-:. 20
He stated that "no international law, not even the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
.
21
was valid because of their ambiguity,"
"The present Trial can, therefore, as far as crimes against Peace shall be avenged, not invoke
existing international law, it is rather a proceeding pursuant to a

17Ibid., p, 70; Montgomery Belgion, Victors' Justicet A Letter
Intended to Have Been Sent to a Friend Recently in Germany
Falcon Press, 1946), p, 72.
18
Biddle, "Nuremberg," p. 71 •

19 IMT, Vol. 1, pp. 168 -70.
20 Ibid., p. 168.

21 Ibid,

London:
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new penal l aw, a penal 1 aw enac t e d on1ya·f 't e:;r th e er im e. 1122

Hence,

"Nulla Poena Sine Lege" was in jeopardy. 2J
Stahmer also pointed out
another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the
commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence.
The Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which
were the one party in this war. This one party to the
proceed:tng is all in one: creator of the statue of the
Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge.
It used to be until now the common legal conception that
this should not be so; just as the United States of .America,
as the champion for the institution of international
arbitration and juri.sdiction, always demanded that
neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of all parties,
should be called to the Bench. This principle has been
realized in a.n exemplary manner in the case of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.24
Stahmer begged that "the Tribunal direct that an opinion be submitted
by internationally recognized authorities on international law on
the lega1 elements of this Trial under the Charter of the Tribunal • ., 25

But the plea was in vain.

Nevertheless, writers on Nuremberg have:

questioned. the Tribunal's legality, using Stahmer's arguments.
Critics argued that some aspects of the Trial were based upon
retroactive or

~.QC

129st facto law especially in relation to th€ first

two counts of the indictment.

They purported that no basis for the

Trial existed in international law before the Trial took place.

Op-

ponent.s of Nuremberg further contended that the Anglo-America.n legal
doctrine of conspi.racy was used to try defendants whose own legal
had no such doctrine.

Accordingly, the Tribunal tried the Gem.an

22 Ibid., pp. 168-69.
2 Jib"d
1

• '

24Ib"d
J. •
? c:

f

p. 169.
pp. 169-70.

·-.)Ibid •• p. 170.

E}'Sk'.'".

defendants on a doctrine which neither they nor some of their judges
(France and Russia) had viewed as criminal prior to the Trials. 26

On

the other side, Robert K. Woetzel pointed out that
thr~ court's conclusion with regard to crimes against peace
did not violate the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla
Eoena sine lege •••• This was confirmed by the intern~tional community which justifies the conclusion that
the principles applied by the court were just. Since the
maxim •• , is a principle of justice and the concept of
crime against peace was just, the maxim was not violated
by an application of th€ concept.27

Another charge against Nuremberg is that the Tribunal was not
composed of neutral judges. 28

Lord Hankey stated that "a valuable

precedent might have been established if neutral judges would have
served on the bench!12 9

Perhaps Hans Kelsen described it in the best

way, stating that "the IMT was constituted by captors who created the
law, prepared the indictments, brought forward the evidence, conducted
26snvergate, "Conspiracy Ibctrine," p. 260; Appleman, Militarv
Tribunals, pp. 39-53; Gerhart, America's Advocate, pp, 34J, 431; Benton
and Grimm, eds., German Views of the War Trials, pp. 28-JO; Baird,
~Nuremberg to ~iy Lai, p, 104; Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and AggressivP
War, pp. 71-2; Phleger, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 63; Wyzanski,
"Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 70; Rustem Vamberg, "Criminals and War
Criminals," Nation 160 (May 19, 1945): 567.

27woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials, p. 171; See al.so Bosch,
Judgment on Nurembe_rg, p. 139; Baird, F'rom Nuremberg to ~~ Lai, pp,
115-16; Finch, "Nuremberg Trial and International Law," p. 22; Bernays,
"Legal Basis of th£ Nuremberg Trials," p. 8; Charles E. \iJyzanski 1
"Nuremberg in Retrospect," Atlantic Monthly 178 (llicember 1946); 57,
which is a different view of the Trials than his own artich in
Charles E, Wyzanski, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial.? Dangerous Frecedu.t,"
Atlan~}c fonthl;y 177 (April 1946): 66-70; Finch, "Nuremberg Trial
and International Law," p. 33.
0

28

Sil verga te, "Conspiracy Ibctrine,"

pp. 260-61.

29Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimes, "Postscript, by Lord Hankey-' A Political Commentary'" p. 128.
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?Q

the prosecution, and judged the defendants, .,.J

However, Eer.:ian Pl:tlcger

objected:
Theoretically it SE:ems desirable that the Charter and the
Tribunal should include neutral nations and neutral
judges. But in a world where there are few, if any,
genuine neutrals, and where the feeling was general that
no nation should remain neutral with such issues at
31
stake, this end was obviously not possible of attainment.
Opponents of the conspiracy charge stressed the dangers of collective responsibility or guilt by association.3 2

They also criticized

the conspiracy count on the basis that it presumed the guilt of the
defend.ants before the Trial, and that it applied to subsequent
tribunals.33

The French Judge D:>nnedieu de Vabres even argues that

conspiracy was a crime unknown in international law.3 4

Th€ justices

finally compromised,35 even though the U.S. justice was against it.3 6
Francis Biddle later changed his views.

Since there were many dif-

fcrenccs in legal procedures, a number of problems developed. and they

had to be compro~ised.37
JOHans Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law, ti Interna ti~mal Law Quarterl v
(London) 1 Sur.:.mer 1947): 154; Hans lliard, "The Nuremberg Trial Agains"t
the Major War Criminals and International Law," in Benton and Grimm,
eds., German Views of the War Trials, p. 102.

3lPhleger, tlNuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 62.
32 suvergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine, ti p. 4; See also hau:gham,
U,N,O. and War Crimes, p. 39; Benton and Grimm, eds,, Germ.c..r. ViE:ws

of the War Trials, p, 5.
JJSilv•,rga.te, ":;onspiracy fuctrine,"

pp. 4-5.

34 Ibid,, p. 172.
'1 r.:

_,..:;>Ibid., p, 17.3.

36Ibid., pp. 180-81.
37Appleman, Mil?. tary Tri bur_als, p. viii.
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Jesse Joseph Silvergate presented an interesting summation,
which also included Allied aggression.
Doubts about the fairness of the Trials are also raised
by the fact that only Gennans were tried for the
commission of acts declared criminal under the Nuremberg
Charter. If Nuremberg was meant to establish an impartial
precedent for the punishment of acts declared criminal
under the Charter, why were not the Allies also prosecuted
for violations of the Nuremberg principles? Why were
the Russians not prosecuted for participation in plans
for aggressive war as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
why were the British not prosecuted for the bombing of
German cities, such as Dresden (where some 150,000 people
were killed, almost all non-combatants, for Dresden
was full of refugees), or why were the Americans not
tried. for the crimes against humanity cornmi tted by the
dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.JS
Richard A. Falk also looked to "the American repudiation of Nuremberg"
in relation to Vietnam.

The Soviets trampled on these principles in

:::hstern Europe; the French, in Indochina and Algeria: and the AngloFrench, in the Suez ca.mpaign.39
Charles E. Wyzanski and Robert K. Woetzel acknowlHdged that thr
liuremberg Tribunal was an ad hoc court. 40

Furthermore, one can sec

from the Conferences during World War II and also the difficulties
41
during the beginning of the Trial, that politics was involved.
The

38 sn vergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine," pp. 261-62.
39Richard A, Falk, "Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Lturr-," ir;
Baird, From Huremberg to My Lai, p. 284; See also Iavidsor., ~urenberf~
Fallacv; Telford Taylor, Nurember~ an,Si Vietncgn_: , An America!': Tra.::::edv.
( C:hicago : Quadrangle Books, 1970 •
40
Wyzanski, "Nuremberg in Retrospect," p. 59; Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 40,
41 Maugham, U,N .o. and War Crimes, "Postscript, by Lord Hankey-' A Political. Commentary'" pp, 110-2J; Jessu~ Modern Law~, p. 9?;
L':rnest 0, Hauser, "The Backstage BattlP. at Nuremberg," Satc.:rtlav E~r:ni..!2f,
Post ?18 (July 19, 1946): 18 f;t seq,; Wyzanski im;"lfod thc..t i t was
political justice, not legal justice. (SPc l'iyz,a,11zki, 11 hU2'.'"':·:bro:rt;--f1

r·air Trial?'' p. 70.)
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Russians wanted to decide things for the.mselves and the .Americans, pushed
by public opinion, carried the other illies into the Trial.

The

United States seemed to be very concerned over drafting the aggressive
war counts and controlling them.

Officials in Washington pressed

for this action as if private gain and vengeance prevailed over statesman-like co-operation for the common good.
The Nazi defendants sought to prove that others had done exactly
what they were accused of doing thn>ughout the war.

They tried to

justify·theiracts by the state of war, that they were individually
against war, desiring peace as loving fathers and husbands and as model
citizens.

And finally, they pleaded to superior's orders:

were Hitler's pawns, 42

that they

WritErs have usually been more ciritcal of

the appeal to superior's orders, siding wiih the Tribunal. 43
Only 4,000 out of the 100,000 captured documents were translated.

But Jackson felt that this numberwas sufficient to convict

the defendants, 44

Could translation of the other 96, 000 ha W-: made a

better case for them?

Jackson also pointed out that Hitler ignored

international treaties, citing a document that Hitler signed--"declarations of neutrality must be ignored, ..4 5 George Creel felt that the
42 Gerhart, America's Advocate, p, 38; Superior orders were
never recognized by Germa.n, Russian, French, or American law. (Su;
Wyzanski, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" pp. 66-7,) Eaugham disagrees
with Glueck in Maugham, U,N,O. and War Crimes, p. 77.
43Morgan, Great Assize, p, 3; Phleger, "Nuremberg--/.. Fair Trial'?"
p. 64; Ii'inch, "Nuremberg Trial and International Law," p. ;.1,
44 Jackson, Nttrnberg Case, p. viii.

45
p. BJ.

.
Ibid., p, 146; Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and .Aggrr-:ssivc War,
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statement by the Allies in conference during the war, "Germ.an criminals
whose offenses have no particular geographical localization ••. will br:
punished by joint decision of the governffif:nts of the Allies," contained no mode of operations and could result in a ridicule of justice. 46
b'ugene Ihvidson stated that the Tribunal surprised the defendants with
documents and witnesses. 4 7

In another book he remarked that the legal

procedures weirc unfamiliar to the German people.

48

Sheldon Glueck stated that
The duty of a State as a member of the Family of Nations

to punish violations of the prohibitation.s imposed by the
law of nations is a matter of international law; but
whether any particular local sovereignty requires prior
specific "implementation" of international law by
"conversion" of its prohibitions into those of municipal
criminal or military law, or prefers to punish them
directly without such intercession of domestic legislation,
is a matter of each State's own constitution--an arrangement
of municipal law. 49
John Alan Appleman stated:

But since all states including Germany, have freely
admitted that there are some concepts of international
law which are binding, then admittedly there is no such
thing as absolute sovereignty.50
r<.oreover, such things as murder are violations of the Gerrr.an penal
1 -•T 51
.,.,..".

And more true to the point, murder has been regarded as a crir,,

46 creel, War Criminals, p, 164.
47 D<widson, Trial of the wrmans, p. 32; See also
?-nd Lifr· of Gennany, p. 122.

Id~0:;-i,

fr,·a th

48 Ibid.
4 9Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, pp.

50Appleman,

Mil.~ta1:1

65-6.

Tribunals, p. 14.

51 Ibid., p. 29; Bernays, "Legal Basis of the 1:ure.J11berg Trials,"
p. 8.

throughout history.
Rustem Vamberg asserted that "the Tribunal gave a false showing
of justice with three acquittals ....52

"There was indeed, nothing wrong

with the Nurnberg trial except its psychological background and its

In another article he said that the Tribunal

juridical foundation.".53

was "observing the legal formalities while ignoring the legal principles ... 54
He pointed out in his other articles as well that it was necessary to

preserve the law by acting in a just manner.55
One can not dismiss the atrocities of the Germans on the other
hand, since the wanton all-out destruction of an innocent people is
morally wrong.

Robert K. Woetzel put it quite well:

..• the following is clear; leaders of a nation were
trif:d for offences against international law and
morality, against compacts and treaties, and against
the peace of nations;
they could not hide behind the shield of sovereignty;
their laws were no excuse, where such laws were
unjust and contrary to recognized principles of law and
morality;
.56
their official capacity did not protect them.

52 Rustem Vamberg, "The Law of the Tribunal," Nati on, 163 (October
12, 1946): p. 400; See also Stone's views in Alpheus T. Eason, Harlan
F. Stone; Pill§.]." of the Law (New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 715, J-w
sc·emed against the proceedings when Biddle was appointed; he appeared
somtwhat jealous of Jackson's position in Ibid., pp. 714-19.
5Jvamberg, "Law of the Tribunal," p. 400,
54Ruztem Vamberg, "Law and LegaJ.ism," Nation 161 (Decemb(;r 1,

1945):

575.
!'

c

.:>.JidP..m, "Criminals and War Criminals," Nation 160 (Lay 19, 1945);
.567-63.

56 woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p.

X.l.J.J..
For the horrible atrocities
inflicted. on other peoples by the Nazis, conff;r such work~ c..;:; Eugen Kogon,
The Tncory and Practice of Hell: The Gcrrri<:~n Concen'tration ~mps and thr
;.~·str:~·, 1'<:hj~E!.f. trans, from the Genria.n by Heinz !;ordcn (:;ew York:
Berkley Publishing Corp., 1950); Creel, War Criminals; r•;ovir· "N:ight and Foe";
alwarci Crankshaw, Gestauo: Instrument of ?yranr,y (l;ew York: Viking 1-'rr.:::::;:::.,

1956.)
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J.

H. forgan stated that the Trial. was "fully justified fron an ethical

point of view. ,.5? But the author of' this study poses the following
questions:

Were not the signatories of the Tribunal. guilty of similar

crimes as the German Nazi leaders?
evil?

Were they free from Macbeth's

Were they morally justified for what they did?

hypocrities?

Were they not

The author of this study questions the total justification

of the four victorious nations sitting on the Tribunal since they
were not free from guilt.

Upon entering Germany during the last

stages of the war, the Allies had bombed German cities where high
concentrations of civilians were living.

The Russians even used.

German prisoners-of-war as slave labor not only during the war but
also nany years afterwards.· At the same time the other Allied Powers
forced Germans to labor in their own countries as well.

57Morgan, Great Assize, p. v.

CONCLUSION
From the evidence presented at the Nuremberg Tr1aJ.s of Fritz
Sauckel and Albert Speer, one can not deny that these two men were
quil ty of the crimes the TribunaJ. convicted them of.

It is evident

that both men did not take part in planning an aggressive war.

How-

ever, they did use forced labor, and in the end, sanctioned harsh
punishments for violations.

Sauckel exploited the workers in regard

to their f'ullest output, disregarding a great deaJ. of expense for
their upkeep,

On the other hand, Speer, even though he adopted cruel

standards at times, answered as a man who had faJ.len into a trap
under the sway of Hitler's power, displaying his ardent love for the
German pc-ople and their lifelihood.

Nost assuredly, the difference

in these two men's attitudes had a lot to do with their sentences for

Speer tried to allegedly assassinate Hitler several times.
of

thcs~

Both

men were guilty under the law established in the London

Charter, 8 August 1945.
One has to admit that murder is a crime, and the Nazi leaderr.
were not innocent.

Yet, one can not ignore the fact that the victors

were gull ty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, too.

For a

trial to take place of this magnitude, true justice could only be
c·:n:-rciscd by a team of neutral judges.
a0::. Stalin's would have to be tried, too.

.And accordingly, crimes such
A committee of the Unikd

States House of Representatives in 1952 found that the Russians wnrc
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quil ty of' the, Katyn Forest Eassacre of 11,000 Polish officers in 19h2,

At the Trial the Russian prosecutor, Rudenko, asserted the the Germans
undf;r the auspices of GOring bad ordered the massacr8.
had also invaded Iiinland and the Bal tic

sion?

state~:--was

The :!tussians

this not aggres-

What about other Allied aggression?
The Cfrmans had used forced labor.

But under Allied Control

Law No. 3 of 17 February 1946, Gem.an males fron. fourteen to sixty-five
and women from fifteen to fifty could be forced to work • 1

The American

Zons in Genrrany employed forced labor; the Russians used it after
th~, war to rebuild Stalingrad and to develop a Soviet rockst procra:i /
'11 he A:-:-ericans gave rrance hundreds of thousands of German prisonc·rs.

Ai.'tc:r' the GE: mans surrEndered the British and the Americans :put

Germc..rl prisoners to work in their own countries,

Thousands of Genna.r,::.

".I

laborr·C.: ir. RiJ.ssia until the mid-1950's/

0/en durine; the wa:'.'.', the

?.ussiar.:.s forced more than 2 ,500 ,000 Gennan prisoners t.o perform r.arci
st:n:onous tasks.

4

The U. S, put the Japanese, in co!1centra tion c;irrp::;,

but th0 standards were much better than those ir. thr; German can:ps. 5
Di...vie sor; ct.2- ted that "the country in effect becamr..' an irimn:ss cor,-

c'ntr&tion camp," when the Allies enterPd Germany.
In total evaluation, the Trial of
1~

._,
lJiiVl.C.SOn,

~·ai o·f'q
Tr1
"i.£1.8

1945-46,

,..._
Vl::rrnans, Ii• .J"1'"'
O,

2 .L.,.b.d
1 •

<

/Ibid,~

pp, 518-19.

t Ibici. , p •

5Ibid.
/

I

519.

p. 584,

~;Idem, DPath and Life of Gcnnanv, p, 89.

6
with special t.r:i,,::.t<:·_,
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upon Sauckel and ;;.ii;eer in this study, was carried out in all the
impa.rtiali ty and fai!'ness that mEO;n of calibre and reputation can

There was nothing in these two meri' s trials to warrant

ascertain.

suspicion that they W(:re tried unfairly.

The lawyers that were as-

siGTied to Sauckr!.l and Speer were the best possible defense they could
r~vr:

L\ren though Sauckel' s defense seerad to be too hard on

had.

Sauckol at

timf'~S,

both lawyers wanted to get at the heart of the matter,

trying to prove their defendant's innocence if it could be established.
Their trials were fair.

In general, translation difficulties were

:not too big of a problem.

Within the stipulations of the Charter

to a small degree) the Trial was fair, bu~
1)syond fairness, was it just?
tir.i• ?
0

What was the state of Germany at the

What was the internatior.al law?
1/hcn consid.\<;rir:.g the legal and moral aspects of th€ Trial,

or.~;

has to review for sane time.

:for what trv"'Y did,

cspeciall~,

The Nazis were certainly not justifiHl

in relation to crimes against hu,rnanity,

On th•' othE:r hand, the Allies were not free from guilt.

It should

br: re:iteratcd that justicf: of these standards should not have

;:;,llowccJ to have taken plac12 at all.

br:~-r.

Nuremberg as r:a."'1y wr:.. tcrs (i'.,-

cl udir;g the author of this study) have assertf:d was a "travi:-·st.y of

v•:ry valua.rJlE: purpose and an indispensable precedent if a d.i.r:·r:rcnt
course of action had been followed.

If the legal f::-a:,1f::worJ.: would

7wyzanski, "Nurenberg--A Fair Trial?' p. 69; 3es o.lso C, Amolc5.
i.r.d~-n;on,

Lead1 r:;;"

10hi:3-90.

"'Ynf: Uti1i ty of the Proposed Trial and Pu:;.ishmc-n-: of ~c:ny
(~P~~7·00r •2a1).
American F°:Jl i ti cal _.§cience fa-:_ViN: ~~
-~·
-~1·

,;,.,;_ . . . _.. --- -,,,
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have

br~f':n

cst2.blishcd bi:,forehand in th"'' Ki: llogf,-Briand Pact so that

th0 sp..-,cH'ic method of operation and punishment was laid down, then
there would have been a precedent in internationaJ. law for "triaJ. of
war criminals."

?ven then, under the circll!f:stances of Russia and

the victorious powers being the Tribunal (author, judg&, and prosecutor
in one package), justice would not prevail,
of crimes similar to those of Gennany?
would have been the best solution.

Had they not been guilty

Perhaps triaJ. by neutrals

The author was shocked when

looking over the legaJ. arrl moral aspects of the Trial.

Silvergatr:

stated:
The' charge that Nuremberg did not represent impartial,
international justice, but was victors sitting in judgr;;cnt
over the vanquished also raises doubts about the Trials.
Si::ct; all the judges at NurrnJ.berg were members of the
victorious allies, row can one speak of the Mili ta:cy
:·ribunals as either impartial or international? Fbr
i;urmbcrg to have been truly international and inpartial
the Allies should have included judges from neutral
countries as well as a Gennan justice. Finally, the
iffipartiality of the Tribunal is brought into serious question by the inclination of Nikitchenko as the Russian
judcn. Since Nikitcbenko had participated in drafting
the Nuremberg Ch3.rter at the London Conference, would
it not h3.ve been wiser to have chosen someone not conn€c~cd
with the legislation of the Nuremberg law to sit in
judgm"mt? A similar question could be raised about thro
selection of Biddle as the American judge, since he
lud been involved in the drafting of the Yalta 1·iemorandLL"':,
which stressed the application of conspiracy charges
L-;;ainst the Nazis. As it turned out, Biddle changed his
';c:,rlier views and became the most out~poken critic of -;,r,c
coriS}Jiracy do ct rim-: at Nu remberg. But President '1'ruma::-.
could not have been aware of Biddle's chanec of hf:~art
c:.-:; thr: timfe of his appointment.
Pcrha.I'S, if Trurr.an hac3.
bv}n, Biddle would not rove, been appointctl. 8

The second point to consider is the sta tc or condi.tion of
0

uSilvergate, "Conspiracy IbctrinP," pp. 260-61; See also
Belf:'"ion, Victors' Justicr; for morf~ infonnation on th< T:ric~l s in

this :s3.nr: light.

G 1 :ri~anJ

after World 1'12..r I.

Various political ·partii:::.s st.:rovr: to r;ain

th'? upper hand in lrlTrnan.y, contributinr; to the confusion and disarray.
Later on GFrmany disbanded the

"wrech~;d"

Treaty of Versailles and

thr; Briand-Kdlogc Pact undE:r the will of Hitler.

YE:t, the only pro-

bh:m with that treaty is that it stated no specifics for violations

of aggression.
netaliates.

Whc,n any country is subjected to sdf-denial, it

Ta.kine; advcritag-:: of this situation, a man likr: Hitler

with his charismatic ability and mad character could easily sway a
P' ople to follow his pa th.

When any country puts its faith in a

as a leade:r, it looks for guidanc('.;,

r:-1a.L

And Hitler was that man who

based b.is ideology of dictatorship upon racism, national social is:::.,
and ir.:periciisn.

Furth" rmore, Lord Acton was not wrong when he stated

th.2.t "nowi::r tends to corrupt and absolute: power tends to corrurt

absol-:..:tsly."

Yet, Davidson maintained that
it w::lS cr;rtain, howcv(;r, that they [the Geman peoplE]
al1 knew a great deal about the persecutions ar.d that
th0y n0ve:rthelr~ss took arms against the world to keep
th"se !'I"' n in power. The trial. therefore was the trial
o i' the Gr::nnans • 9
~rials

probably tried the German

Th

;;c;_rcr.ibcorc

1Jut

~~hr-. p0oplE~ thcmselV'-~S

in a sr:nsc,

should not receiVf-:: the E':r:.tire

Gr,rna.r! l adcrs of the Nazi govcnm1ent led the

'lb

pcopl~'

peoplf~.

bla:::<.-~:.

'.~'h\

HE:;,:::t.., th•<·

concept of "justice" in international law is discuss, :cl

by w:ri tcrE throur.,hout the annals

0

o~n

history.

'.Lo

E~_:go

Grotius, ofter:
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callccl the Father of International Law,
th8 victorious statp acted on behalf of the international
cormn.uni ty when it punished the wrongdoers providing that
nr;i the-ff thr prince nor his followers had bf~en invol vod
4 ~ +·n·" '"·ron'rc• com'"l. ttr.d e 10
~-•

>J

t""_;:

.QO

V"ll -'·

.. lUd.

0

-__:.

On thr-: other side, 'Ihomas Hobbes declart)d a ruler to be bound by no

rules but his orm.

hachiavelli instructed his master in the rules

of the rs1entless struggle of political life and in the rules of
survival.

Tb; i:::ighteenth-centur'J Swiss jurist, liinmerich von Vat tel,

wrote in his Dro:i.t des Gens:
!:':' thr:rcforr, thE,re was anywhere an unquiet nation always
r.--ady to damagi: others and to cross them, to bring theri

doncstic troubles, there is no doubt that everyone would.
lu2. vc: th-;" right to join together to restrain it, to
punish it., and E'Vr~r: put it forever out of the possibility
,..,J:>

'"'~

aoir:b aanagf,, 11
'

•

-

'

'

Cp:prrJ1cin st.E ted:
~·::r:

richt of "t.bc bslligercnt to punish, during ths war,
h'ar criminals as fall into his hands is a wc.ll:rc::0cn:.z• d rrinci:;:il0 of International Law. It is a
ric;r~t of 1'hich he may effectively avail hil'lsLlf after he
r:i'.s occ:;.pied all or part of enemy tcrri tory, and is th·Lls
in the position to seize war criminals who happen to b~;
there. fo; may, as a condition of the armistice, impose
i.;pon the authorities of the defeated State the duty to
hand over pf;rsons charged with having committed war
crinr·8, r~·rsardlcss of whether such persons are pn;sent
in the t~,rri tory actually occupied by him or in the
territory which, at the successful end of' hostilities,
br is in &. position to occupy. Fbr in both ca::r:s thr
i:cc~:ssd r.:.rf' 1 in effect, in his power., •• ~'°"
sucl~

.

~

ccr:~,

On"; could co on forever with givin::; the pros s.r.d

but s-:vc·ral th:i.ngs are CE::rtain:
lO!bid,,
p.

r:;i." .)·.~.Le:· 1

(1) tfill.t justice, in rct,cl"-'- t0 11!",0,t

1
~. O•

11 (~uoting Eb:ncrich von Vattel in Ibid.,

10-11

t

r7

r·,

r;

t

".::

-1:

tbr.: Allir_,s had done,

H&s

not handro out; (2) that thc·re was a crrtain

amou,11t of vengeancs; (3) that neutrals should have tried th(; German
Nazi leaders; (4) that Speer and Sauckel were not innocent; and (.5)
that th,::re was no firm basis in international law spccifyinG "trial
of war criminals."
Sh(';ldon Glueck stated that "Nur(;ntberg was ur.likdy to become a
precedent in donestic law but a precedent in internatonal law. 1113
But one nust rei:i.embcr that

we can only pray that we may not be so tested, and in these
awful tines we must prepare ourselves, should the awesor.c
choice bo impos~d upon us, to react, even under duress, in
the right way.1 ·
~::i.nston

Churchill also warned:

"So perish all who do the lil:.e

1 r:

acair.t. tt•J

?or an educated and exploring person lookinG into the i'<::cts
of a;; rvsnt or into the depths of a personality, a.r. indcptr. study

is nt::c"ssary.
ccrtair. lit;ht

they did.

How::ver, one may wonder if events happened ir: a
othc~r

than they did, and why they happened

th~

way

Or maybe, one may look at what could J:1ave happer:r=;d,

Yr:;t,

to thf; trained and cautious historian, the facts arc the nost css•,.ntia.l
clue i:,o his study (sine(': it is impossible for one to operc.-v'.
cicn tly).

GLLi::.··

Rnalisn prevails over idealisn in th(:; tr2,im'·cl histo:!:'i,:,:·. 1 -:;

Hor1d, wd th<-o search for what happened can be attained cy no ctfr.:t

11

-'Glueck, Huremberc Trial and Aggressive War, pp. 9c:-1oc..

14Philipp FdLl, "The Ghosts of Nurenbcre," ktla:1t1c : ~9 ('.:c:,1-c:"

1972):

?,QI
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a.nd. t.o ,judge them in an CJ\.'J)erienccd effort is the :job of the historian,
'l'hcrcfore, in final judgment, the author o:f this study wishes to givc
his owr: su'Tlr.la tion.

There is no other conceivable thing so horrid in the estimation
of man than the cruelty cYJ1ibited by another.

And when a whole race

of human beings an) involved in total annihilation, the fact of man's

inhumanity to man is even a greater abomination.

Throughout the

history of mankind, one sees races, peopl€s, and creeds being subjectd
to har:::.hncss and total destruction.

Yet, when one looks at raa.n, he:

ca..""1. not h'Jlp sr:cing a spark of goodness in the worst of ther.i.
1 ec.ds

can be

o~e

to a:::l: wha:i:. q ur:.li ties nan possesses.

;~:::.ven

And no other answi::r

when one isolates nan from his nilieu then to say trJE..t

good,

Then, one has to conclude: that the

&round him is the catalyst,
tlv-~

This

enviro;;..r~:'.::~

One can go a step further and poir..t

7.G

;;:.1roady established social structure, the political orgaJ1izatior.,

a:td thr::) ccononic setup or lack of these that a particular people
posscr:~;.

Rr al istically speaking, one has to have laws in ord.e:r for

near: to l ivc i!'l a ci vilizcd world.

Furthernorf;, no rnc..n should tr.;·

another o:" a crh!c when that nan or group of pc.;rsons c>rc cuil ty c
Tho author neither condones i;ha t the: ;;;:;,z:l s di-.,
dc·c; h( c..ppro·,r,: o: the; actions taken by the

Allis:::~.

_

APPENDIX A
S.AUCKEL OOCUHENTS 1

Sau-1 12 (See USA-206, *190)-PS) Decree by the FUhrer for the execution of the decree concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation, JO September 1942, •• XI-604, 605; XV-253.
Sau-1 *13 Sauckel decree, 25 October 1942, concerning the position
of his representatives in the occupied territories: pursuant to his
directives they are to recruit labor for the Reich and to regulate
employment and wage scales in the occupied territories with the aim
of achieving greatest possible productivity,,.XI-604, 605; XV-253.
Sau-1 15 (Sec USA-206, *3044-PS) Order No. 4 concerning recrui tr.ient,
care, shelter, food, and treatment of foreign workers, both male and
female, 7 Eay 1942 ..• XI-60L1-, 605; XV-253; XVIII-492, 501.
Sau-1 **22 Order No, 11 concerning the limitation of the duration
of the employment status of Eastern Workers as well as the granting
of bonuses and leaves, 2J July 1943 •• ,XI-604, 605; XV-45, 253
Sau-1 2S (See USA-227, *1913-PS) Agreement between the Flenipotc:;~t<-r:.
General for Labor Allocation and the Gennan Labor Front concern.inc tbt
care of foreign workers, 2 June 1943 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-253
Sau-1 ·lHjS(a) fr:cree for the f:xecution of the decree concPn1ing
thf; employmc"nt conditions of Ea.stern Workers, 26 I·!arch 1944 •.. XI-(04,
(,Oj; XV-li.5, 25J, 259; XVIII-498
Sau-1 -:.t67(a) Sauckel decree, 11 April 1942, concerning wartime
employment of youth: all male and female pupils from the age of
10 ar~; to be employPd in agriculture; some schools are to be closui. ..
XI-604, 605; XV-253, 259: XVIII-500
::.;au-1

-i<82

From an address by Sauckel to the labor recruitmC;nt :::t.2.fi:::

6 January 1943, on principles of recruitment in occupied tcrri.tori.cs:
labor draft; good treatmEmt; no promises that Ci:lnnot be kept; as;::;urancc::
of best possible protection of life and heal th; propaganda :for C.~ rm:.tn:: •.•
xr-C.05; xv-15, 185, 253, 260
*Ibcu.11ents reporduccd in IHT Ibcur:ient Volum,:;s XXV-XLII.
**lloctc':',cnts r .:;ferred to in TI·1T Ibcu.r:i(;nt Volunes XXV-.t:LII.
1 The Sauckd documents listed below recciv(:d the P.Xhibit
numbers stated ( not identical with Sauckd document numbers).
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9?.
S;:;.1~-1
'33 Circular tc dl Gaulei ters of the NSDAP in their capacity
as commissioners for thP. employmP..nt of labor ••• XI-605; XV-253, 260;

XVIII-505.
Sau-1 85 "The Nature of the Commitment of Labor in Greater Gennany" •••
XI-605; XV-?5J, 260.
~6
Highlights of an address to the president of the Gau employm<:0nt offices, 24 August 1943, in Weimar ••• "Service to the People-nighest Purpose" ••• XI-60.5; XV-137, 2.5J, 260; XVIII-503

Sau-1

Sau-1

-M-88 From a speech by Sauckel to the presidents of the Gau
Labor offices, 17 January 1944: Germany's power and good treatment
of foreigners made a success of the labor program; significance of
good reception camps in the Gaue ••• SI-60.5; XV-253, 260; XVIII-503

*6 ~cerpt from Himmler decree, 20 February 1942, concerning
rP.crui tf.lr·nt and employment of Eastern Workers; Recruitment by comm issio"' :·
of the Reich hinistry for Labor; billeting in closed shelters, if possibl0 fenced in by barbed wire; constant guard, subordination to
Stat-:-; I-oliCP measurf:S, •• XI-604, 60.5; XV-253
Sau-2

Sau-~
J2 r·ron the convention concerning the treatment of prisonE~rs
of wa:r, 27 July 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part II, p, 227) •• ,

XI-604, 605; XV-253, 256
::i::::~11-t

~:~G
_.:.:tract fror.i a Sauckel memorandum. 26 August 19~,2, cone<:·:·.::.:,
"':rr,c::.:.::-:c::-,t. o:n prisoners of war: sufficient rations on the ons hand
c:.nd willing:wss to work on the other are required for full productivit:.•. JI-:::o:.~' (05; xv-253' 256, XVIII-488

Sau-:

39 Instruction sheet for the general conditions applying to
the c::'ploymc:nt of prisoner-of-war labor, 20 March 1942 ••• XI-604, 605;

!V-253, 2.57; XVIII-488
Sau-C. 47 Food rations for prisoners of war and Eastern Workers
(fr:cr::: E by thf~ Reich I·:inister for Food and Agricul tun,, 8 Cctobcr 19:,:~) •. ,
xr-i:oi:~, CO); XV-2.53, 258
0

Sac.-::.:

52

:·.~ r::l: '-t:::·

T~ibutP- by the Eastern Workers:
Decree of the .:10ich
of' ?i.nance, ? ;:ieptcmber 191¥2 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-45, 253, :::.'.h;

XVllI-LJ.98
'3::1..i-·)

*24

Sauckel prcclamation, 20 April 1943, to all laoor allocatio: .

,):ff'icr: s: necessity of total employment of the population oi all oct.:upi'd tr:rri tories; principles of most efficient labor allocation;

c::1pl0yFJ::nt o:f Gennans as cadres and leaders; training for :.rades;
reM:1J-~<.: tion according to production and oropr~r tr•:a :.r.J.<::nt o :, for(:igr:
\;ori·c:::•••• XI-605, XIV-631; XV-253, 260; XVIII-502, 50.5

93
Sau-4 *16 Extracts from Sauckel decrefJ for plant managers, concerni.ng
employment and labor conditions of Eastern Workers, 25 June 1942:
just treatment; wages in accordance with comparable German wage scale;
German Labor Front is charged with care of workers; State Police
will handle serious infractions of work discipline, etc·. ; no leaves;
no religious care by either foreign or German clergy ••• XI-604, 605;
XV-253; XVIII-501
Sau-4 **31 French agency for the care of French wor}c;ers employed
in the Reich ••• XI-604, 605; XV-37, 253
Sau-4 *'*49 Circular decree of the Plenipotentiary General for
Labor Allocation, 21 July 1943: food rations for prisoners of war
and Ea.stern Workers ••• XI-604, 605; XV-253, 259
Sau-5 95 Excerpts from Sauckel's speeches; documents from the
Times of Changes and Reconstruction, 1934 ••• XI-606; XIV-607; XV-60,
61, 253, 260; XVIII-506
Sau-6 96 National Socialist Governm€ntal Activity in Thuringia, 1932-33 •••
XI-606; XVI-607; xv-253-60
Sau-7 97 Excerpts from The Activity of the Thuringian Regional. Government 1933-34 ••• XI-606; XIV-607; XV-254, 260
Sau-8 93 (See RF-5) Europe Works in Germany, Didier, 1943:
Kobilizes the Labor Reserves" ••• XI-606, 608; XV-254
Sau-9

"Sauckel

94 Affidavit of Dieter Sauckel •• ,XI-606; XV-254, 260; XVIII-505.

*~Jau-10 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Affidavit of Carl Goetz, former
member of the Dresdner Bank Directorate, 21March1946 ••• XV-206; XVIII483, 502

Sau-11 .Affidavit by Hahn, 8 ftiarch 1946, and chart showing calories for
Gt:rman and foreign workers, Eastern Workers and Soviet prisoners of
war •.• XV-270; XVIII-500
Sau-13 2 Chart showing method of inspection and administration of
labor, •• XV- 33
Sau-14 J

Chart showing Sauckel's executive staff ••• XV-207

**Sau-15 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Interrogation of Iar~;, former
G€rman Hinister of Agriculture, 22 May 1946 ••. XV-6; XVII-417
Sau-16 Interrogation of Seldte, former G<'..::rman Labor Minister, 27
Hay 1946 •• ,XVII-417
Sau-17 Interrogatory of Voss, medical officer, on camp conditions,,,
XVII-418; XVIII-501

Sau-18 108 Interrogatory of Scharmann, C..ennan Public Health officiaJ.,
7 May 1946 ••• XVII-418; XVIII-501
Sau-23 117 A£fidavit, 2 July 1946, by Heinrich Fa.lkenhorst, former
chief of the Reich Nain Office in the Party Charcelltry: a few days
b~forc the occupation of Weimar, SauckE>J. had tr,lephoned him that,
because the competent authorities had made no decision concerning
Buchenwald Concentration Ca.mp, he believed it his duty in the interest
of the Weimar population to order the camp to be surrendered intact
to the JU.lies ••• XVIII-505
Sau-T (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Appointmm1t of the Plenipotentiary
General for Labor JU.location, 21 March 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-2'J-l-

Sau-8 (See USA-208, *1666-PS) Order for the execution of the decree
by the Fuhrer concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation,
of 27 Harch 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; x.v-255
**Sau-9 Order No. 1 concerning the appointme.nt of the Gauleiters a::;
deputies for the commitment of labor in the Ga.uP, 6 April 1942 •••
xr-604, 605; xv-255
**Sau-10 (See USA-206, ~2044-PS) Position and treatment of workers
from the East .•• XI-604, 605; XV-2_54; XVIII-483
Sau-11 Order No. 5 concerning tht=i exclusive competency of thE! agencie:::;
of the Labor ConHni tmcnt A&ninistration for the acceptance of order::; for
the allocation of workers, 11July1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-255
**Sa.u-1Li. (See USA-206, *304J.i--PS) Order by th~ ReichsfUhrer SS and
Chief of the German Police, of 13 November 1942, concerning marking
of Eastern Workers ••. XI-604, 605; XV-254

Sau-17 Decr13c concerning the employment conditions of thE:: ::astern
Workers, JO June 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-44, 255; XVIII-492
**Sau-18 (Se~ USA-206, *3044-PS) Circular concerning thf; enploymrnt
of i.astem Workers; instruction sheets for plant manager.:; and &..sterr:
Workers, 4 August 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-254, 257
**Sau-19 (See USA-206, *3044-PB) Cooperation between the- agencic::; o:·
labor conuni tment with the Gau dircctorat-:·s ••• XI-6()'.;., 605; ZV-27, 2:;.. ;
XVIII-502
Sau-20 Service contract for forPign dom1=?stic
605; ;:v-255

fomaJ.~·

hnlp ... XI-604,

1 The Sauckel doCU.'T!Pnts given be:low did not receiV(· Sauckel i:cxhibi ~
nu':tbers and are therefore listt=:d by thr~ir Sauc.kcl docUJ'P'.~·nt ~:umbf~r~ \ac
compiled in the Sauckel Document Book and prc_:.sr,n ted. to the :.:ourt).

er

/..I

Sau-21

Decree concerning thP. work book for forden workers, 1 May

1943 •.. xr-604, 605; xv-255
**Sau-23 Order No. 13 for the assurance: of order in factories, 1 Nover;-.bc,r 1943 ... XI-604, 605; XV-39, 255
**Sau-26 Order for the regulation of err:plo:Y'rvnt conditions of the
female Eastern Workers, domestically employed, 24 July 1944 .•• XI-604,
605; xv-256; XVIII-499
·HSau-27 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Decree of the German Labor Front,
4 September 1942, concemin g position of foreign workers in the factory
.•• XI-604, 605; XV-254; XVIII-501
**Sau-30 Order No. 14 concerning the creation of a Reich inspectorate
and the tasks charged to it ••• XI-604, 605; XV-256

Sau-33 Decree by th8 Reich Hinistry of Labor of 10 July 1940 conccrninr,
employment of prisoners of war •. ,XI-604, 605; XV-255, 2.56
Sau-3 5 Decrcr; by the Reich Ifiinistcr of Labor 01· 7 April 1942 concern in;
craploynent of prisoners of war •.• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 256
*·*Sau-37

The cmploynent of French prisoners of w&r., .XI-604, 605;

xv-255, 256
Sau-JS Visiting o:f Italian, French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of
war by their relatives in the Reich., ,XI-604, 605; XV-255, 256
"'"-Sau-4-0 OrdYr No. 9 concerning the crCJJ:lination of shd t'"'r, food,
hf'n.tinc, and maintenance of the camps by ca"'.lp mechanics, 14 July 1942 ...
XI-604, 605; xv-255, 257

*·XSau-41. (Sr;e USA-206, *3044-PS) Publication by thi: G:.ri;1&J1 Labor
Front of 4 August 1;i42: thf; maintenance of the canps for - astc:rn
1-:Crkcrs is charged to ihe G.-'man Labor Front ••• XI-60'+, 605; XV-2_9:;.,
~7'.Sau-42-43

r

c_'.

'

. .I'

Camp di:;cree o: 14 July 1943 concerning foreign work ere .•.

XI-6<J-r, 605; xv-255, 258; XVIII-500
"**Sau-44 l)~crcB concerning the shEJ.tering i.n car;ps of workPrs i'oc.
the duration of the war, 14 July 194J ••• XI-6CV.J., 605; J:V-'i.55. 25c1;
XVIII-500

S01u-'..r5

Moat inspection law of 29 Octobr-~r 1940. .XI-604, 605; xv-255,
I

?58
Sau-h6 Food ra.tion card regulation for foreign civilian woykcrs, 10
Lruly 1942 ... XI-604, 605; xv-255, 258

Sau-1.J.8 Decree regarding the taking along of food during travel of
foreign workers to their homeland, 9 June 1943 •.. XI-604, 605; XV-255, ~
Sau-50 Decree concerning the taxation and the legal treatment of the
workers from thn Occupied 1 astern TerritoriP-s, 20 January 1942 .•• XI-6~
605; XV-44, 255, 256, 259; XVIII-498
Circular decree of 13 July 1942:

Sau-51

transnittal of wages to the

Occupied Eastern Territories .• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 259; XVIII-498
Explanation o:f ordor No. 11 of 23 July 1943 concerning the

-l!·*Sau-54

granting of bonuses to Eastern Workers ••• XI-604, 605, XV-255, 259

**Sau-55

xr-6Q4.,

1be transmittal of wages of foreign workers and employees •.•
605; xv-255, 259

**Sa.u-57 Decree concerning Christmas bonuses for Eastern Workers,
6 December 1943 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-45, 255, 259
**Sau-58 Decree concerning the employment conditions of Eastern
Workers, 2.5 l'.ia.rch

Sa.u-.59

1944 •. ,XI-604, 605;

XV-45, 256, 259; XVIII-498

Decree concerning an equa1i7.B.tion of payment for the employment
1944., .XI-604, 605; XV-256, 259

of :foreign workers, 11 August

HSau-60

Regulations for health provisions of the .;_astern Workers ••.

xr-60!-:-, 605; xv-255, 259
Sau-60(a)

:iJccrec of the General Plenipotentiary for the Allocation

of Labor concerning hospital and institution costs ••• XI-6()4., 605;

xv-255,

259

Sau-61

Accid.r:ntal inf;urance for foreign workers during transportation

..• xr-604, 605; xv-255, 259
Sau-62 Circular ord~r concerning the supply of clothing and shoes to
Eastern Workt=:rs P..mployed in the Reich ••• XI-604, 605; xv-255, 259
Sau-fil•, The provision to Eastern Workers of the Reich with items o;·
nsw clothinE .•• XI-604, 605; xv-255, 2.59
Sau-64(a) Labor commitment of foreign workers; loss of luega.Ge in
tra.nsit ••• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 259
Sau-65 Order about the use of foreign doctors, phamacists, dfmt.ists,
and dent.al tr:-,chnicians ••• xr-604, 605; xv-256, 259
·x-~sau-67 Rcgulatfon concerning the industrial prot•!ction o: fordgr.
workers and :..astem laborers ••• XI-604, 605; xv-256, 259; XVIII-499

->H-:Sau-68

!fodicaJ. care for workers from thf~ Eas:. •• ,;-:r-60l+., 605;

XV-25.5, 2.59

9?

Sau-80

(Rcjectcd),,,XI-606

Sau-81

"Manifesto of Labor Allocation" .•. XI-60_5, 607; XVIII-41:39

**Sau-89

Article enti tlf:d "Revision of Employment Conditions of
Workers" ... XI-605; XV-256, 260, XVIII-500

~.astern

Sau-90-91
Sau-92

(Rcjected), •. XI-607

(Rejected.) ••• XI-606

Sau-99 Order specifying attendance of male and female Red Cross
nurses at transports •. ,XVII-418; XVIII-501
Sau-100 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1943:
in camps •.• XVII-418

investigation

o:

sanitary measures

Sau-101 Mr:raorandum for French prisoners of 'h'ar on leave., ,.XVII-l+18,
XVIII-497
S2.u-102

Reichsgcsctzblatt:

Emergency services order ••• XVII-419

Sau-103

Rcichsgesr::·tzblatt:

Conpulsory labor decree .. ,XVII-419

Sau-108 Affidavit of the recruiting officer in the :ast; Sauckcl 1 s
activities ••• XVII-419, 420
Sau-109

List of Sauckel's decrees ••• XVII-419, 420

Sau-110-112
Co~nr:ission~;r

Laws dealing with the position of the Reich Defons(~
and with the allocation of labor ... XVII-419, 4 2 0

Sourer~:

TI-iT, Vol. 24, pp. 233-38, (Defense fucumr:nts).

APPENDIX B
SPEER OOCUNENTS

-xs:p-1 L;J Hcmorandum, 20 September 1944, from Sper::r to Hitler:
GoebbP.ls and Bonnann designate both the "self-responsibility" of
industry as conceived by Speer, and Speer's ministry as "inimical
to the Party"; Speer's task is unpolitical; only voluntary zeal on
part of the plant managers could increase i:>roduction •• XVI-4JJ, 446
*Sp-2 47 F'rorn a speech by Speer, 9 June 1944, to representatives
of the Rhenish-WestphaJ.ian industry on the "self-responsibility" of
industry introduced by him in 1942; before 194?.--management by state
authorities; after 1942 by experts in annament production; the authority
of the plant manager must never be limited, •• XVI-4J4
Sp-3 11 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 21/22
J.larch 1942, on Hitler's disagreement with treatment of Russian
civilian workers, •• XVI-440; XIX-192
Sp-4 13 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 30 Earch
1943, concerning better rations for Russian and Genna.~ miners,,.
XVI-!.~L;O; Y.IX-192.
Sp-5 q Copy of Speer's discussion with Hitl~'.r, 11/12 Septcmbl'lr 19:;,::_;.,
concerning id(;ntical. rations for Italian and Geman anna.r:ient f'acto:~:lr ~,
, , • XVI-4l:·O; XIX-192

*Sp-6 44 Letter, 7 May 1944, from Dr. Walter Schieber, fonner
chir:;f of the A:i:nament Supply Office in the Spc(;r Ministry to Spi:!cr:
offenders who have served their sentence are being transferred to SS
plants operating in connection with concentration camps and arc thus
lost to the armament. industry; foreign workers are being transfsrrrod
to SS plants by the Police for slight misdemeanors; strong objr ctior: ..
to i'urthcr encroachments by the SS economy •• ,XVI-442, 473; XIX-20'?

"

'

42 Goring decrc-e, 22 April 1942, concerning thP establishriof th~.' "Cr:ntral Planning" within the "Fbur Year Plan." Chir,;fs:
Spr:r-r, Eilch and KSrncr; tasks: decisions concerning planning,
distribution of raw materials, etc,, .XVI-453; XIX-190
+:·S:p-7

r:~

Sp-8 2 Copy of excerpts from minutes of the neetinG of th0 Central
Planning Board on 26 January 1943; statement by Sp(·er on recruiting
Gn·mans for the a:mament industry., ,XVI-461-i-, L}65
,

( ... .....

/~'

L

99
-l<:Sp-9 3 Connent by SpeGr in the course of a meeting of "Central
Plruming". 21 December 19lt-3, on diff(!rneccs bctwe(:n himSE;lf and Sauckcl:
Spr:,er believes that F're:nch workers on production work for G€rmany
should stay in France •.• XIX-187
*c
•
1nltJ
.r.r
ral ...Cf.;..
• ·..;p- 10 4 T(; 1 c t YJY,, 4 January
;r-r-}, .i.rom
...c peer t o l.7E:ne
,_,,,·d -r,· ....4 n } 'r:;;.Tl.:c.:
workers in "priority plants" (Speerbetriebr:) in occupied terri tori(;S and
in Italy to be spared deportation to GE1rmany ••• XVI-467

Sp-11 5 Copy of letter from Speer to Sauckcl, 6 January 1944, concerning inactivation of Gennan factories and their transfer to occupi~d
territorif:s •. ,XVI-467; XIX-187
Sp-12 8 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 19/22
Jun•: 191.J.4, concerning prod.uction in the occupied Western terri torfos ..•
XVI-468; XIX-188
*Sp-U L~5 From the conferences, 3 to 5 Junp, l 9LJ.4, between Spscr
and Hitl'°'r: Speer complains to Hitler that every month 30 to 40,000
forGign workers or prisonr.;rs of war recaptured by the Police after
f1.ight attempts arc assigned to work in SS plants, their labor thus
br:,ing lost to other industries •• • XVI-47l~

Sv-14

15 Copy of excerpt from memorandum from Speer to Hitler,
Dcitel, GOring, 30 Jun£; 1944, concerning inability to produce :f"urcls
•. • XVI.J.rf,5; i:I.X-211

Sp-15 16 1290-PS Copy of top secret report from Speer to Hitler,
30 August 19Ltl*, concerning situation of C..2errnan chenical industry
following very sGrious air attacks ••• XVI-485; XIX-211

Sp-16 25 Copy of letter from Speer to Gauleiter Simon, 5 Sept('ffib<:~r
1944: instruction not to destroy the "Ninctt(:" ore mines in Luxr:mbour[,
in casr, of capture by the Allies ••• XVI-487
Sp·-17 21 Copy of telE:type order from Spe,,:r to variou:::; Gauld tcr:::,
14 September 1944, to paralyze industries to be· evacuated in thr.; ~:c::t

. , .i:VI-429
~sp-lG

22 'l'clctype, 15 Sc:ptembor 1944, fron Sper.r "',,;o Bor;;arm condirectives from Speer to all Gau Leaclsrs of the we st.err. G;::.c.,,
regarding procedurr~ for rnndling plants and production in c:,sc uf
r:vacuation .• , XVI-l~89
~aining

:)p-19 4c3 Copy of extracts from Hitler's protocol, 19/20 1~u:~st 191}li,
acrccing with Speer's plan not to destroy industri<.s to b<: rvacw.;.t.-]d
•. ,;:n-490
Sp-20 17 Top-secret memorandum from Sp<::i:or to riitl· r, 11 ;;ovcI'lb•;:r
1944, concrc:rning dif'ficul ties of coal supply and. .;-;roductior: in Uw
Rub.r c;,,rea, .. XVI-491; XIX-211

100
S1)-21

49

Extracts from a mr,morandt.t.n: from

SPPCT

to G:;neral Guderian,

15 Decemb0r 1944, on thn impossibility of' continuing war in casP
Silesian coal regions are abandoned ••• XVI-491; XIX-211

Sp-22 18 Copy of memorandum from Speer to Eitlt.r, JO Januar; 1945,
on anticipatsd desperate position of th•..: Gcrr:.ar1 arma-::cnt industry
F•;bruary /March 194-5 •.. XVI-491; XIX-211

*Sp-23 26 Hemorandu.rn, 15 March
collapse of German ~~conomy to be
military continuation of the war
war not the fault of the people;
stage of the war •.. XVI-497; XIX-

1945, from Speer to Hitlr:r:

final
expected within a month or two;
not feasible after collapse; lost
destruction not justified at this
211, 214

*Spe-24 JO Letter, 29 !"larch 1945, from Speer to Hitler: re-quest
for rescission of the Hitler destruction order, 19 tr.arch 194 5 . •.
XVI-l+-93; xrx-211, 21J
-)!Sp-?)

27 Hitler destruction order, 19 March 194.5;

·XSp-26

28

all inportant,
installations and objects within Reich territory which thF Enemy r,~.;~h-:
utilize for the continuation of th0 fight ar~ to br. destroyed •.•
XVI-499; XIX-213
Order by the chief of Wehrrnacht transportation, 29 Harci1

1945, ir:lplemcnting the Hitler destruction ordr:,r oi' 19 i:arch 1945;
tra::·ic comm.:nication insta:,.1ations arE:· to br; destroyed

r~ntircly

.. . xv·1-499
Sp-27 46 1764-PS Copy of an announcement o:f a Hitlc r ora~r by
Bom.c..nr:, 23 i·iarch 19L1j, to all Gauleiter on completf' evacue.:.ion o~
c:.vilians from territories exnected to br~ taken by :.h~~ Allirs, .•
XV-1JJ, 181-i-; XVI-499

*Sp-2[', 31 Decree by Hitler, drafted by Speer, 20 harch 19h5,
iripler:wnting the Hitler destruction decree, 19 harch 1945: dcstrucLio-·.
of industrial installations is intended to mak:(; i.'Tlpossiblc their
utilization by the encmy4 •• XVI-501; XIX-213
"Sp-29 32 Speer's implementation directives, JO J.zych 1 ~...._ j, to
Hitlr::r's decrre of the same date: Speer'r.:. d(JCrce prrtai.r:ir+: w ct;,
paralyzing o:f industrial and supply plnnts rer.iains in fore<~; ~;:::-o
duction to be continued to the last noncnt r-Vf~n in 2i t:;a tic.:·.-~:- o :··
r::xtrr::r: dif:f'icul ty •.• XVI-501
"''Sp-30 19 Speech, 16 April 1945, ri:::cordcd by Speer in Har.b;,irg;
a.ddi t:lonnl harm to German economy to be avoided. at 1,his s
of th<::war; there is to be no more destruction or pare.lyzing o:f Tlcc!H,s,
~o:::r:u:nication installation, etc. in G'.'nnany and occu:-iicd t- :r:::-i t.orirs;
political and Jewish inmates of concentration c2..rr:,'s :.o be s·-.:rrr.rnio·r;d
to cns~~.y troops; "Werewolf" to cease C:!.Cti vi ty imm' clic:; tPly; :::oous-::u:ffs
l-t':'.Vf 1JriorHy in transportation, etc •.• XVI-503

101

*Sp-31 6 Letter from Speer to Sauckel, 28 January 1 C)lJ.4, conparing
('.:!ilployraent of woml';!n in war work in l:ngland and Gennany ••• XVI-589
*Sp-32 7 Letter, 11 ff.arch 1944, from Speer to Sauckel: workers in
Fn=:nch armanent factories not to bP transferred to Gennany despi tr::
Sauckcl's decree of February 1944 ••• XVI-589

Sp-33 29 Copy of the order for the execution of Hitler's 19 March
1945 order •.• XVI-.589
Sp-34 14 Copy of an order from Hitler to Speer, 21 April 1944,
concerning construction of six buildings.,,XVI-.589; XIX-209
Sp-3 5 61 Excerpts from Speer's notes on points under discussion at
Hitler's conference, 3/5 J·anua.ry 1943, concerning use of French labor
,,,XVI-.589; XVII-428; XIX-187

*Sp-Jp 50 Undated answer to questions by Speer's defense counsel
by Hans Kehrl , former head of the Planning and of the Raw Material
OfficEO in the Speer Ninistrjr: SauckP.l. himsP..l.f allotted labor to
the usi::r agencies; he did not recognize the authority of "Central
Planning" or of Speer to issue directives .. ,XVI-.589; XIX-190, 198
*Sp-37 51 Answers to questions by Speer's defense counsel by Dr.
Walter S~hicber, fomer head of the Ann.ament Supply Office in the
Spoer Iii nis try, 2 to 6 Yia.y 1946: Sau ck el negotiated directly with
user agencies; majority of Gau Leaders and others fought against
"self-responsibility" of industry as conceived. by Speer. Speer
opposed attc~tps of the SS to participate in the direction of
industry,,,XVI-589; XIX-190, 207
-»Sp-38 52 Intcrrogation, 3 April 1936, of Schmel tor, former head
of the Labor Allocation Office in the Speer Ministry, by Speer's
defense counsel and a representative of the Prosecution: statement
concerning the methods used in requisitioning labor; SS very often
assigned concentration camp prisoners directly to industrial plant~
without informing the Speer Ministry: Speer requested protection fo;.·
workers in ~riority plants (Speerbetriebe) in occupied territories;
SpP.cr requisition concentration camp prisoners but they w~re offered
him as labor by thf.: SS; Sauckel assured Speer up to 194-1+ that forr';ign
labortrs came to Ge:rmany voluntarily •• ,XVI-577, 590
*Sp-39 53 Interrogation, 10 Hay 1946, of Dr, Hupfauer, forr.ior
chief in the Central Office of the German Labor l<"'ront and liaison
man between the Labor Front and the Speer Ministry, by SpbE:r's
def.-:·nse counsel and a representative of the Prosecution: Sauckcl
alone was responsible for the mobilization and allocation of labor
forces and for the working hours of all employees; worl::ing hours wert·
the sa.':lc for foreigners and Gennans; Speer Wc.illtr:-0.. total mobilization;
he could not issue orders to Sauckel; differnncr:s of opinio:1 bctwccr;
Speer and Bornann; Speer was opposed to cher.iical warfare; in 1945
h(, wanted to withdro.r1 800,000 workers fror: the urma'ii.cnt indtrntry to
repair r.'ar da':lage; other topics. , • XVI-590.

Sp-l~O
.)'J- Interrogation of SauE'r, fonncr o:fficial in the Spr:,r;r
Linistry ••. XVI-590

Sp-41

55

Interrogation of Frank ••• XVI-590

*Sp-42 56 Interrogation, ~~O Hay 1946, of Wal tr;r Rohland, former
head of the St•,;cl Production Department in the Speer Ministry and
deputy of the Plenipotentiary for Armament .8conomy in the P.henish Buhr
region, by S:oc,er' s defense colll1sel and a representative of the Prosc:cution: allocation of workers assigned by Sauckel to the arrr,arnr:~nt sector
was the task of the Speer hinistry, but the practical implenentation
was a natter for the labor offices subordinated to Sauckel.. ,XVI-.590;
XVIII-476
*Sp43 57 Interrogation, 2 Nay 1946, of the witness Kempf, Speer's
private secretary, by Speer;s defense counsel and a representative
of the Prosecution: in spring 1944 due to an illness, Speer did not
attend the: "Central Planning" conferences; he was against ths construction of the six subterranean pursuit plane factories; r.ot a
member of the SS; conff"rence by Speer with Hitl<:o:r, f:nd of Earch 1945,
j.n which SpEfr opposes Eitler's d€struction plans; oth0r matters ..•
XVI-590
+:-Sp-44

5e

Int<:rrogation, 10 Nay 1946, of G';neral Guderian, fc:rmcr
Staff, by SpH::r' s defense counsel: mf;asurE;S by Speer
to 1Jrrvrcni destruction of bridges, roads, and vital installations,
etc ... XVI- .590

Arr.cy Chief

o~c·

*Sp.-'... 5 .59 L'rlterrogation, 1 and 2 Hay 1946, of Dietrich Stahl, for1·1<.: r
liaison man to the heads of the main comni ttees of the Technical c:;·::·ic'.,
by :3pser' s defense counsel a.r:d a representative:; of the fros0cution:
;:.>peer's :;;ilans, F'ebrua:ry and March 1945, for the elimination of Hithr,
::Somc:_.nn, Gor:bbcls, and Himrr.ler by poison gas ••. XVI- 590
Sp-46
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Intc-rrogation of Karl Brant ••. XVI-590

Sp-lJ,7 61 .Answer to questions by Spoer' s defense counsel, :L, June
1946, by Uanfred. von Poser, former liaison officer of the 1,r.y
(}nc::r2.J Staff to the Speer Ministry:
during the withdrawc..l of Gc:nr:2.!.
troops from occupied territory S11eer made great efforts w :;:.reserve
ccono:.ic installations; Speer ordered about 15 food trains :o tb iiLil::::
r.. rca after it was occupied in order to prevent a fo:.ine •.. ;)::1-~::,9,~
Sp-4~;

J
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Interrogatory of witness Hans EaJ.zachcr,

industri~~1it,t,

.i\ur:ust 19L~6 . .. XXII-:396

7 Sp-h9
63 r::fidavit, 27 Aueust 1946, by Baur~bach, forr;-r-:".' co::;bat pi1o::
at the r:nd of the war SpPE)r did more than any other ~:;c.nnar, w asstirr_
thr; necnsstties of li.fc for thc: (~ rr:~an p· opl' ; ciue to 3pu~r' s ul.rr:cth" ~.
to Bau::Jxwh non<: of the responsible pr:·rsons in th, ·:nird fr ich t:r rt
ablr to leave Germany by air; Spr.::~:r persuaded the C..e.u Lcad•c·::C o~· Ew;:bu::::-c
to Gurrr:;nder !:a!':burg to the Allic;s w1thout res:i_Gfa;.~,cr • t tc ..•. x~:1r-

APP2NDIX C

LO!IOON AGREEHENT 01'' 8 AUGUST 1945

Agrcer.Kmt by the Government of
the United States of America,
the Provisional Government of
the French Rt: public, the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern
Irela...VJ.d, and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution
and Punishm2nt of the Major
~lar Criminals of the 1\lropean
Axis.
WHERbA.3 the United Nations havrj from time to time made declarations of their intention that war criminals shall be brought
to justice;
Mm \ifHER:SAS the Eoscow Declaration of JO October 19hJ on
Gsrr.ian atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German officers and mccn and m0mbers of the Nazi Party who have been responsi bl s for or have ta.ken a consenting pa.rt in atrocities and c::-:·ime:s
Hill be sent back to the countries in which their abominabls ci.e~:cis
were done in order that they may be judged and punished according tc
th1; laws of these liberated cuuntries and of the fru: Govern:%nts tha~.
will be created therein;
~11IEREAS

this Declaration was stated to b8 without prrojudicc to the case of major criminals whose offEnses have no particular gsographic location and who will be punished by the point dr·cidc.
of' thF: Goverm1ents of the Allies;
AND

AND THEREFORE the Governmr:mt of the Uni tr:d States of ;\ra~ric:~,
tho Provisional Governmr,nt of the l''rench Republic, the Govcrmrir:or:t
of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Irdand, ar"c tl:.
GovsrrL"lsnt of the Union of Soviet Socialist fo:publics (hereina:f':.<:?.:
callr:~d "the Signatories") acting in the interests of all th< ,Jr.:. iJ ~.
I:ations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto r..:.v.:~ concluded. this AgreemE:nt.
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tOIJ.
/~:rticlr:

1. The-re shall bs (;stablishcd after consultation with thr
Control Council for Gnrma.ny an International Military Tribunal for
th•: trial of war crirainals whosf~ of1~enscs have no particular gc,oEraphical location whether they be accused individually or in thd:r
capacity as m<::mbers of organizations or groups in both capacitiEs .
.Articl~,

2. The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the
International Lilitary Tribunal shall be those set out in thr: Charter
annexed to this Agreement, which ChartE:r shall form an intE::gral
part of this Agreemrnt.

Articlf" J. Ehch of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps
to r.iake available for thr: investigation of the charges and trial
th1: major war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the:
Int~;rnational Military Tribunal.
The Signatories shall also use
tl10ir best endeavors to make available for investigation of the
chargns against the trial before the International I•:ili tary Tribunal
such of thte' najor war criminals as are not in the territories of any
of the Signatories,
i1rticlc 4. Nothing in this Agreemmt shall prejudic£' the provisions
ostablished. by thrc f<ioscow Declaration concerning the rr-::turn of war
cri."linals to th,, countries where they cornni ttcd their crimes.
Article> 5, Any Govc-rrunent of the United Hations r.'.ay adhere to this
1;g:rc c:".cnt by notice givr.,n through the diplomatic channel to the
Govcrr2_,:nt of the> Unitf:d Kingdom, who shall inform the othr:r signa--.o:r:,r
and adhc:ring Govr~·rmncnts of each such adherence,
,~rticlr: 6.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice thE; jurisd:.ction or the powers of any national or occupation court establ:'..:::.lYc.
or to br established in any ;.J.licd tcrri tory or in Gem.any for th•_
trial o·'" war criminals •

..;rtich: 7. This Agrer-:ment shall come into force on the day of signa.tur
and srcll rcnain in force for the period o:f one y12ar and shall co::tir:uc t.h(:reafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to c;ivr ,
-:.hroCi£:b the ciiplor:iatic channel, one month's notic(", of intention to
v·:cmir..atP it. Such termination shall not prejudicr: any proc"':cdinc..;s
dr .c::.dy taken or any findings already madr: in pursuanc<: of thls
AcrecEsnt.
1

IF l:JTnESS 'I/HEREOF th0 Undersigned have sign.Pd the prcssnt.
Agrr+r.~_nt,

OONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945
i:::ach in English, Fr0nch, and Russian, and P.ach :.~~xt to havr; (-.qucu
2.uthr-.:-:ticity.
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Fbr the Government of the United States of America

/s/

ROBERT H. JACKSON

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic

/sf

ROBERT FALCO

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

/s/

JOWITI' C.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
I. NIKITCHENKO
Isl

/s/

Source;

n~r,

A. TRAININ

Vol. 1, pp, 8-9; NCA, Vol, 1, pp. 1-3.

APPENDIX D
CHARTER OF THE

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
I.

Constitution of the

Internationi Mili.tary Tribunal
Article 1. In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of
August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall
be established an Internation 'Military Tribunal (hereinafter called
"the Tribunal") for the just and prompt trial and punish.'llent of the
major war criminals of the E'uropeail Axis.
Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, c.1.ch with
an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed
by each of the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they
are able, be present at all sessions of the Tribllllal. In case of
illness of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some
other reason to fulfill his functions, his al tern.ate shall take his
place,
Article J. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates
can be challenged by the Prosecution, or by the defendants or their
collllsel. Each Signatory may replace 5.ts mel'!lber of the Tribunal or
his alternate for reasons of heal th or for other good reasons, except
that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by
an alternate.
Article 4,
(a)

(b)

The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the
alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to
constitute the quorum.
The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial
begins, agree among themselves upon the selection
from their number of a President, and the Presidf:n t
shall hold office during that trial, or as may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three
members. The principle of rotation of presidency for
successive trials is agreed, If, however, a session of
the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the
four Signatorif;S, the rep:resentative of that Sic;natory
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on the Tribunal shall preside,
Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by
a majority vote and in case the votes are evenly
divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive:
provided always that convictions and sentences shall
only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three
mf:mbers of the Tribunal.

(c)

Article 5. In case of need and depending on the number of the
matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the
establishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be
identical, and shall be governed by this Charter,
II.

Jurisdiction and General Principles

J1rticle 6. 'lbe Tribunal established by the .Agreement referred to
in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major :.;ar
criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to
try and punish pe:rsons who, acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or an members of organizations,
committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
~he jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
rPsponsibili ty:
(a)

CRIMES AGAINST PEA.CE: namely, planning, preparatior..,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreener.ts
or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or
Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b)

WAR CRIN.ES: namely, violations of the laws or cu~toms c:
war, Such violations shall include, but not be lirniteu
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of priser;.: r:::.
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos tagE,s, pl uri:i.r_ ~·
of public or private property, wanton destruction oi' c:i.tir:s,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity;

( c)

CRII>!ES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extemination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts coramitted against any civilian population, before or during
the war,* or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrate~.

*Conuna substituted in place of semicolon by Protocol of 6
OctobGr 1945
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Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy commit

any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by
any persons in execution of such plan.
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads
of State or responsible officials in Govern.~ent departments, shall
not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
Article 8. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determine that justice so requires.
Article 9, At the trial of any individual member of any group or
organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act
of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such
notice as it thinks fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal
to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be
entitled to .apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization.
The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application,
If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what mannC'::the applicants shall be represented and heard.
Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared
criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of a.11y
Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military, or occupati<•n courts.
In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization iG
considered proved and shall not be questioned.
Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged
before a national, military, or occupation court, referrt:d to in
Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership
in a criminal group or organization and such court may, aftr:;r convicting him, irqo s e upon him punishment independent of and additional
to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the
criminal activities of such group or organization.
Article
against
Charter
for any
conduct

12. The Tribunal shall have the right to takE! proceedings
a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this
in his absence, if he has not been found or if the TribunaJ..,
reason, finds it necessary in the intrffests of justice, to
the hearing in his absence.

Article 13. The Tribunal. shall draw up rules for its procedure. These
rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter,
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III.

Committee for the Investigation

and :Prosecution of Najor War Criminals
Article 14. Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor :for thP
investigation of the charges against the prosecution of major war
criminals.
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following
purposess
(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of
the Chief Prosecutors and his staff,
(b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals
to be tried by the Tribunal,
(c) to approve the Indictment and the d.octunents to be
submitted therewith,
(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents
with the Tribunal,
(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its
approval draft rules of procedure, contemplated by
Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shall have
power to accept, with or without amendments, or to reject,
the rules so recommended.
The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority
votP and shall appoint a Chariman as may be convenientand in accordance
with the principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal
division of vote concerning the designation of a defendant to b~
tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged,
that proposal wD.l be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the particular defendant be tried, or the particular charc~:z
be preferred against him.
/:rticle 15. The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting
in collaboration with one another, also undertake the following dutif:s:
(a) investigation, collection, and production before or at
the Trial of all necessary evidence,
(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the
Committee in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article
14 hereof,
(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses
and of the defendants,
(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,
(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as
may be assigned to themr
(f) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary
to them for the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of the Trial.
It is understood that no witness or defendant detained by any
Signatory shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its assent.
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IV.

F'air Trial for Deff':ndants

Article 16. Lr! orckr to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the
following procedure shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying
in detail the charges against the defendants. A copy
of the Lridictment and of all the documents lodged with
the Indictment, translated into a language which he
understands, shall be furnished to the defendant at a
reasonable time before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a defendant
he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant
to the charges made against him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a defendant and his trial
shall be conducted, or translated into, a language
which the defendant understands.
(d) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own
defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance
of counsel.
(c) A defendant shall have the right through himself or
through his counsel to present evidence at the Trial
in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any
witness called by the Prosecution.
V.

Powers of the Tribunal and ·
Conduct of the Trial

Articlr: 17. The Tribunal shall have the power:
(a) to sllr.lmon witnesses to the Trial and to require
their attendance and testimony and to put questions
to them.
(b) t0 interrogate any defendant,
(c) to require the production of documents and other
evidentiary material,
(d) to administer oaths to witnesses,
(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any
task designated by the Tribunal including the power
to have evidence taken on commission.
Article 18. The Tribunal shall:
(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hear.ine
of the issues raised by the charges,
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which
will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out
irrelevant issues and statements of any kind
whatsoever,
(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any defendant
or his counsel fror.i some or all further proceedings, but
;;ithout prejudice to the detem.ination of thP. c!k1.rges.
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Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by ted"u1ical rules of
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
8xpeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence
which it deems to have probative value.
Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature
of any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon
the relevance thereof.
Article 21, The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports
of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the
comr.li ttees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation
of war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other
Tribunals of any of the United Nations.
Article 22. The pennanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin.
The first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief
Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated
by the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held
at such places as the Tribunal may decide.
A:·tic1P 23. One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part
in th~ prosecution at each trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor

may bs discharged by him personally, or by any person or pf.rsons
authorized by him.
The function of counsel for a defenda..~t may be discharged
at the: defenda..11t' s request by any counsel professionally qualified
~o

conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any

other pr'rson who may be specially authorized thereto by the Tri bur~al •

Article 24.

The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following

course:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)

(f)

(er)
\b

The Indictment shall be read in court.
The Tribunal sh:l.11 ask each defendant whether he pleads
"guilty" or "t1ot gull ty",
The Prosecution shall make an opening statement.
The Tribunal shall ask the Prosecution and the
Defense what evidence (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall ruls upor,
the admissibility of any such evidence.
The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be exar:.ined
and after that the witnesses for the Defense.
Thereafter such rebutting evidence as D.ay be held
by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be callc,d by
either the Prosecution or the l})fense.
The Tribunal may put any question to CJ.ny witness and
to any defendant, at any time.
:'he Prosecution and the Defense shall ir:terrogate
and may cross-examine any witnesses and any defe~dant
who gives testimony.

(h)
(i)

{j)

{k)

'Ihe DefE.nsc- shall address th€ Court.
The Prosecution shall address thE Court.
Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal..
The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce
sentence.

Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, and all
court proceedings conducted, in Lnglish, French, and Russian, and
in the language of the defendant. So much of the record and of the
proceedings may also be translated into the language of any country
in which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable
in the interests of justice and public opinion.
VI.

Judgment and Sentence

Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the
innocence of any defendant sha.11 give the reasons on which it is
based, and shall be final and not subject to review.
Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a defendant
on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be detennined
by it to be just.
Article 28. In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the comricted person of any
stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for
Germany.
Article 29. In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out ir.
accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, whic:l;
may at any time reduce or othe:r·wise alter the sentences, but may r;_,::;t,
increase the severity thereof. If thP. Control Council f'or Gennar.y,
after any defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers
fresh evidence which, in itsopinlon., would found a fresh charce
against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the Conmittce
established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may
considPr propBr, having regard to the interests of justice.
VII·.

Expenses

Article 30. The expenses of the Tribunal and of th0 trials, shall
be charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenancP of the Control Council for Germany.
Source:

IHT, Vol. 1, pp. 1016;

N~A,

Vol 1. pp. 4-11.
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